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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the problem of security management for services that
are integrated across enterprise boundaries, as typically found in multi-agency
environments. We consider the multi-agency environment as a collaboration
network. The Electronic Health Record is a good example of an application
in the multi-agency service environment, as there are different authorities
claiming rights to access the personal and medical data of a patient. In this
thesis we use the Electronic Health Record as the main context.
Policies are determined by security goals, goals in turn are determined by
regulations and laws. In general goals can be subtle and difficult to formalise,
especially across admin boundaries as with the Electronic Health Record.
Security problems may result when designers attempt to apply general
principles to cases that have subtleties in the full detail. It is vital to
understand such subtleties if a robust solution is to be achieved
Existing solutions are limited in that they tend only to deal with pre-
determined goals and fail to address situations in which the goals need to be
negotiated. The task-based approach seems well suited to addressing this.
This work is structured in five parts. In the first part we review current
declarations, legislation and regulations to bring together a global, European
and national perspective for security in health services and we identify
requirements. In the second part we investigate a proposed solution for
security in the Health Service by examining the BMA (British Medical
Association) model. The third part is a development of a novel task-based
CTCP ICTRP model based on two linked protocols. The Collaboration Task
Creation Protocol (CTCP) establishes a framework for handling a request for
information and the Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP) runs the
request under the supervision of CTCP. In the fourth part we validate the
model against the Data Protection Act and the Caldicott Principles and review
for technical completeness and satisfaction of software engineering principles.
Finally in the fifth part we apply the model to two case studies in the multi-
agency environment a simple one (Dynamic Coalition) for illustration
purposes and a more complex one (Electronic Health Record) for evaluating
the model's coverage, neutrality and focus, and exception handling.
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THESIS SUMMARY
It is evident that the pnvacy of people, the confidentiality of their
information, the integrity of transactions handling, and the availability of
service systems are all essential and the consequence of any breaches to any
one of these aspects will be costly and could lead to disaster. Therefore
security in computer services has been considered as a core subject in many
new developments.
Information about an individual is absolutely secure, as long as nobody else
has access to it, which is true only in the case where an individual is
completely stand-alone. Information is naturally sharable among groups
such as team, committee, organization, country and federation in a manner
based on trust. However to achieve an accepted level of trust is quite a
complicated issue because as the collaboration grows wider, more
participants are involved with divergent policies and interests.
This thesis tackles the problem of security management for services that are
integrated across enterprise boundaries, which are found in multi-agency
environments. We consider the multi-agency environment as a collaboration
network. The Electronic Health/Patient Health Record is an example for
multi-agency service environment, as there are different authorities claiming
rights to access the patient personal and medical data.
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Existing solutions for security problems in multi-agency services are based
on roles or subject-object access control; such approaches appear to lack the
ability to address requirements such as need-to-know and data-use-control.
Security systems are not different from other computer systems as they are
based on specific requirements and goals. Security system policies are often
based on regulations and the law. The principles in the law give the overall
policies but more detail is usually necessary when the implementation is
being made. In particular circumstances a lawyer would look further.
Security system designers make mistakes by attempting to implement
general principles for cases that have subtleties in the full detail which it is
vital to understand for a robust solution. It is easier to regulate a well-
defined case. Security solutions are designed to enforce a security policy,
which is based on a specific security goal. Security goals originate from rules
and regulations, hence any security solution logically, should be validated
with the regulations on the application context.
The task-based approach is a promising approach, as its rationale is suitable
for addressing security problems in environments such as the multi-agency
services.
While there are a number of task-based security models, a literature review
found that none of them explicitly deal with the security requirements of
multi-agency services.
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Current declarations, legislation and regulations were reviewed to bring
together a global, European and national perspective for security in health
services and to identify requirements. This review highlighted the debate
over security principles, emphasising the need for a framework, which
should be pluralistic and flexible to accommodate many different needs.
Further investigation into a proposed solution for security in the Health
Service was made by examining the BMA (British Medical Association)
model. Three security languages Lasco, PONDER and ASL were used. It
was found that the BMA model does not address the requirement of sharing
information across boundaries of the Health Service. In particular the
principle of need-to-know, which was found in the review to be a critical
requirement in a multi-agency environment, was omitted.
To meet the above requirements such as need-to-know by restricting access
for a specific purpose, a novel task-based CTCP /CTRP model based on
two linked protocols was developed. The Collaboration Task Creation
Protocol (CTCP) established a framework for handling a request for
information and the Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP) ran the
request under the supervision of CTCP. The CTCP/CTRP model was
represented in the Petri Net notation, validated against the Data Protection
Act and the Caldicott Principles and reviewed for technical completeness
and satisfaction of software engineering principles such as focus, readability
and competence.
The model was applied to two case studies in the multi-agency environment
a simple one (Dynamic Coalition) for illustration purposes and a more
complex one (Electronic Health Record) for evaluating the model's
coverage, neutrality and focus. The model satisfied the requirements of the
case studies, handling their scenarios and dealing with errors and exceptions
as they arose.
To conclude the model developed met the requirements identified from an
analysis of the declarations, legislation and regulations. Further work might
include the development of infrastructure based on the idea of the
CTCP /CTRP model for full-scale testing and development. Itwould also be
beneficial to develop a formalisation of the model but this is not simple
because of the open-ended nature of the model giving a variety of task
formations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background and Motivation
The goal of security can be generally defined as protection of assets. After
defining the assets and their values and being aware of any risk (risk
assessmenty, security becomes a matter of preventing assets from being
damaged or stolen, detecting in any case of damage who did the damage,
when and how [39]. In addition security goals include disaster recovery plan.
A breakdown to this definition will lead to more than one focused
definition,
A general definition for computer security can be derived from four
aspects/properties of security:
Confidentiality (Secrecy and Privacy): there is a longstanding thought of
computer security that it is all about confidentiality. Unauthorised users
must not be able to access sensitive information. Privacy is about protecting
personal information, while secrecy is about protecting information
belonging to an organisation [70]. Confidentiality is a well defined security
aspect and compared with the other aspects it is yer)' well researched.
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Military systems are an example in which the confidentiality is ginn higher
priority over the other security aspects.
Integrity (Accuracy and Authenticity): to prevent unauthorised data
modification. In network communication integrity known as authenticity,
provides a way to verify the origin of sent data and ensure that it has not
been altered since it was sent.
In financial systems and databases integrity means accuracy.
Availability: to ensure that the system continues efficiently providing the
expected service to its users. Availability also includes the idea that the
system should be able to recover quickly in case of disaster.
The above are the main security aspects/properties where we try to prevent
any unwelcome events. However we need to examine these properties and
in case of any security violation we need to know where we have gone
wrong in order to correct any security flaw. That is where accountability
(another security property) can help.
Accountability: to ensure a user action can be traced uniquely to that specific
user. However accountability is not an objective in its right. Indeed it is a sort
of policy/mechanism that exists as a help to ensure the other aspects are
covered. Correspondingly authenticity is generally considered to be the
complement of confidentiality.
In addition there is an overlap in terminology. Depending on a preferred
point of view security is an aspect of reliability. IFIP WG 10.4 introduced
2
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dependability to group aspects such as security, reliability, integrity and
availability [39].
Security systems like any other systems are based on specific requirements,
which differ from one application to another. In fact a security system is a
subsystem in integrated system/systems, in which the security subsystem
acts as an integrated part to help other system's functions to meet their
requirements without any harm/abuse to all the entities involved. System
entities include people, their properties (including their personal data),
hardware, software and any external entity that could interfere with the
system such as public communities.
1.1.1 Goals, policies, models and mechanisms
We have so far talked only about security goals, which are just the first part
of the security picture jigsaw (Goals, policies, models and mechanisms). The
general security goal as stated above is to protect system assets by ensuring
security properties confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability
(sometimes used as mechanism/policy to ensure one of the other three
properties) and/ or to protect a system from predicted threats or to cover
defined vulnerabilities. There could be more specific goal(s) depending on
requirements. We deploy a security system to ensure a predefined assurance.
The second part of the picture is the security policy.
A security policy definition depends on security goals of an application.
Security policies originate from rules and regulations that aim to achieve
3
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security goals. Security policies can take different forms (e.g. constraints). In
Chapter 2 there is a discussion on a number of rules and regulations related
to heath informatics. The third piece of the security picture is the sccuriry
models or securiry poliry models which is a more formal phase of the security
policies [9]. Section 1.2 covers a number of security models.
The security picture jigsaw is completed by its last piece the sccuriry
mechanisms. Cryptography and its applications is the most used security
mechanisms to ensure confidentiality; the other well researched and widely
used security mechanism is the access control mechanisms (Section 1.3);
auditing is another example. It is a mechanism to implement accountability.
For instance, our security goal could be authorisation, our security policy to
achieve this goal could be a set of constraints, the Bell-Lapadula model
could be the model to use, and then we can use the Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) as a mechanism to implement our policy.
1.2. Security Models
Several security models have been developed to cover different
requirements. In military systems, security means confidentiality and
information classified according to clearance levels (top secret, secret,
confidential and unclassified). Security models that target these kinds of
applications are called Multilevel Security Models (MLS). An example of
these models is the Bell-Lapadula Model (BLP) [15]. BLP was introduced
by David Bell and Len LaPadula in 1973 for the U.S. Air Force. It is a state
4
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machine capturing the confidentiality aspect of the access control. It has
been considered as a base or a benchmark for most security models and is
used to design most of the available operating systems to support access
controL However BLP deals only with confidentiality, not with the other
computer security aspects such as integrity and does not address the
management of access controL It has been also proven that BLP could
contain a convert channeL To conclude, the BLP model is suitable for an
environment where policies are static.
Subsequent models attempted to fill the gaps left open in BLP. For instance
the Harrison-Ruzzon-Ullman Model (HRU) [43] defines an authorisation
system to address the problem of changing access rights, which was not
addressed in BLP. In business organisations, security requirements are
different as the threat and vulnerabilities different from those in military.
Business is based on competition where threats occur such as conflict of
interest. In contrast to BLP, where access rights are usually assumed to be
static, in the Chinese Wall Model [17] the access rights have to be re-
examined at every state transition, to avoid conflict of interest. The Biba
Model [16] is another example of MLS but it deals with the integrity aspect,
not with confidentiality. In fact Biba policy is the opposite of BLP policy.
The Clark-Wilson Model [24] considers security requirements for
commercial applications. It has two mechanisms to enforce integrity: the
well-formed transaction; and the separation of duties. The Information-
Flow Model deals [57] with the problem of convert channels that has not
been addressed by BLP and considers a system as a secure system if there is
5
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no illegal information flows. It should be noted that the above models are
not similar structurally. More challenging security requirements are found ill
the sharing of information and services across security boundaries where in
contrast to the ~ILS models the information follows horizontally
(Multilateral Security Policies) [9] rather than vertically. An application
example of this kind of security requirements is found in health care
information systems (Electronic Patient Record). The British Medical
Association (BMA) has developed a conceptual model to coyer
confidentiality requirements in health care information systems [10, 11]. The
BMA model is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
1.3. Access Control
Although there is no single security definition, there is agreement in the
computer security literatures that computer security is required to cover
three aspects:
• Confidentiality: a system resource can only be accessed by an
authorised entity.
• Integrity: data has not been altered or deleted by unauthorised entity.
• Availability: services are efficiently accessible when needed by
authorised entities.
Having a further deep look at the above aspects we can figure out a
common factor. It seems to be the security problems comparatively
speaking, which occur as a result of unauthorised access. Access control is
6
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the security backbone. In the absence of good access control a computer
system could experience a confidentiality threat for example confidential
information becomes accessible by an unauthorised entity, an integrity
problem as data could be modified as result of unauthorised access, and a
denial of service as an example of how poor access control could affect the
system availability. In computer systems security is often reduced to access
control. An item of information should only be accessible by authorised
users. Basically the access control is a relationship between subject and object.
A subject could be user, computer program or process and an object could
be file, database record/table/view, or a piece of computer hardware. A
computer program could be a subject or an object. However it is not an easy
job to determine a system's subjects, objects and access methods [56]. The
first formal access control model was developed by Lampson [53].
Lampson's model is structured in the form of a state machine where each
state is a triple (S, 0, M). S is a set of subjects, ° is a set of objects and
M[s,o] is an access matrix containing the access rights that subject s has for
object o. This model was later refined by Denning [40]. These models used
the traditional access rights (read, write, execute, append) but not the more
recent access rights such as those required in a collaboration environment
(viewing, coupling) [78].There are two techniques to implement the access
control matrix. The first one is called capability where the access rights are
kept with the subjects and the second is the Access Control List (ACL)
where access rights are kept with the objects. ACL is easy to implement and
works well in simple systems or mixed ones where it is easy for users to
7
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define their own permissions but not in systems where access permissions
are defined by the system management. For instance it will be difficult to
tum off access for a particular subject. In ACL there is no way to delegate
access authority for a specific period of time and it is difficult to perform
security checks at runtime. Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 implements ACL.
The advantage and disadvantage of the capabili!J is plus or minus the
opposite of the ACL. Capabili!J is likely to be more popular in the internet
based system taking advantage from new technology such as digital
certificates. However there are operating systems such as Microsoft
Windows 2000 where both ACL and capabili!J are used. There are two well
know types of access control: Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and
Mandatory Access Control (1vfAC).With DAC users decide how to protect
their own objects while in MAC the system takes the decision by comparing
the object's label against the subject's label. MAC implements multi-level
security policy - a policy considered by the BLP model. Military systems are
an example of MAC implementation. The Discretionary Access Control is
widely used in the commercial operating systems (e.g. UNIX and Windows).
Grouping Users in DAC was not enough to deal with access control
administration as it is one-side grouping (subject grouping). Managing large
systems in the form of subject-object pairs is difficult if not impossible
especially ill dynamic authorisation environments. This security
administration problem was tackled with the concept of Role Based Access
Control (RBAC). In RBAC users gain their access to system resources via
roles. Users are assigned to roles (e.g. based on their duties) and permissions
8
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associated with roles. RBAC can be configured to enforce both D_-\C and
MAC [23, 63]. OASIS (An Open Architecture for Secure Interworking
Services) [45, 93] is a solution for a flexible cooperate or interoperate
application or service. It is a more relaxed Role Based Access Control model
and it is one step forward to the task based approach. OASIS is managing
roles in a different way from the other RBAC Model. It claims to support
decentralised, parameterised roles and instead of delegation OASIS introduce
the appointment notation. However making the hierarchies implicit, OASIS
will not capture relations that might exists among roles [7]. RBAC is
implemented in most of the modern database management systems (in
ORACLE since release 7.3) and operating systems such as Microsoft
Windows 2000. RBAC is well documented on the Role Based Access
Control web page at National Institute for Standard and Technology (NIST)
[60]. For further reading about the access control models and mechanisms
refer to [72].
1.3.1 Need for a holistic approach
Although, more or less, there is at least one security model for each security
aspect and a strong enough security mechanism and tools (e.g.
cryptography) to implement these models, security systems repeatedly fail
[12, 77].
Bruce Schneier In his book Applied Cryptograpfty [75] described how
mathematically safe and secure digital systems can be built. Two years later
in the second edition of this book [74] he went as far as to write "it is
9
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insufficient to protect ourselves with laws, we need to protect ourselves with
mathematics". This book is widely cited and used. After seven years
Schneier wrote another book Secrets and lies, Digital Securi(y in a ;"Ye/uJorked
world [77] in which he more or less rewrites the idea of the first book as he
states that it was naive to consider the cryptography as alone providing
absolute protection. However that was not due to a weakness in
cryptography but because there were more important aspects that need to
be considered. The following concludes Schneier's general arguments:
• Systems are vulnerable and hacking knowledge is easily available.
• Causing harm does not need that much skill or special techniques.
• Technology alone cannot prevent a number of attack classes.
• Successful attacks should be published when feedback appears as an
important factor in improving system functionality.
• Security problems are not about technology; they are rather about
how to use the technology.
• Detection and response is the right way to improve security not by
using preventive countermeasures to avoid different attacks.
These arguments were supported by a good collection of real examples and
as a result of comprehensive analysis.
System developers learn from their mistakes and learn more from public
feedback. The public feedback is considered as an important input to build
more improved and dependable systems. To attract valuable feedback
systems' failures should be published. This, however, would not always be
10
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possible as it conflicts with basic nature of the cryptosystems. Systems other
than cryptosystems are more dependable as they react to the public
feedback.
Anderson in [12] emphasises this point and gives a number of examples of
failures of cryptosystems deployed in bank systems. Some of these frauds are
simply caused by simple errors of implementation and operation. These kinds
of attacks do not require sophisticated techniques.
1.4. Cross-organisation access control projects
The following are some examples for projects using models discussed in
section 1.2 and the available mechanisms to develop application for
collaboration networks requirements:
The TIHI (Trusted Interoperation ojHealtbcare Information) project [90] designed
as a mediator in the form of a gateway, is owned by the enterprise security
officer to mediate enquiries and responses. This mediator attempts to allow
protected selective sharing of information between collaborators in an
environment where the available mechanisms (firewalls and passwords,
private and public keys, and encrypted transmission) provide adequate
protection from adversaries.
The collaboration environment (WebOnCOLL) [21] was designed on the
context of the regional healthcare of Crete [84]. The security service of this
11
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project is based on digital certificates and a combination of digital signature,
public key cryptography and secure socket layer.
Coalition for Networked Information (CN!) ill a discussion draft [54]
exemplifies the Cross-Organisational Access Management Problem in
licensing agreements and collaboration sharing by assuming that the
resource operator has reached some satisfactory resolution on this question,
whereas the issue is one of testing or verifying that individuals are really a
member of this community according to pre-agreed criteria. CNI in this
work has defined sets of analyses and evaluation criteria as follows:
feasibility and employability; authentication strength; granularity and
extensibility; cross-protocol flexibility; privacy considerations; accountability;
ability to collect management data. These criteria were used to analyse and
evaluate the requirements for the users and the resource operators against
three access managements approaches: proxies, IP source filtering and
credential-based (password-based credential and certificate-based
credential). The study shows the advantages and disadvantages of each
approach.
The Digital Library Authentication and Authorisation Architecture (DLA3)
[58] attempts to enable cross-organisational access management of web-
based resources, using the digital certificates (X.509 standard) and secure
directory services (LDAP directory standard). It aims to implement
authentication and authorisation functions ill the context of licensed
12
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information resources in university libraries. However the author of this
paper argues that DLA3 might help in a situation where there is a need to
restrict access to particular individuals across the organisation boundary.
DLA3 is based on three principles: 1) privacy by ensuring that the service
provider knows only that the individual is an authorised member of the
consumer institutional community as a default case; 2) information
partitioning; 3) separation of authentication. The future plan was a pilot
project, sponsored by the Digital Library Federation DFL, to cover the
following issues:
• Formal specifications and procedures.
• Further test for the Statistical Role, Persistent Identifier and Access
Denied Message, and working out to be part of the service provider
licensing negotiation process.
• Certificate revocation.
• Caching guidelines.
• HTTPS (secure HTTP) transaction with attributes and values to be
encoded in XML.
For future work, in addition to the above issues, the team which has
developed DLA3 aims to consider the Cross-Organisational Access
Management approaches proposed by Lynch [54].
Work by Neil Ching and Vicki Jones [22] attempts to argue that the identity
of the client will often not be enough by itself for a service provider to
determine whether the client is permitted to access the service (e.g. whether
13
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the client is over 21 years of age). The general idea of this work to tackle the
problem of the identity is that a service provider generates a permission
(credential) regarding a specific client's request, rather than giving fixed
pernusslOn.
The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) [29] has
sketched a security architecture to control the flow of the information,
codes, and access to services across boundaries at two levels: enclaves and
domains. An enclave is the lowest level network unit (LAN, Workstation)
and a domain is a set of enclaves sharing some characteristic. In this work
the classification boundary, which is a set of enclaves that operate at the
same security classification level, was particularly discussed. Within or across
classification domains, there may be several types of interrelationships
reflecting different trust and collaboration. A boundary controller provides
functionality for the security requirements, such as authentication,
encryption, filtering, labelling and auditing. A common public key
infrastructure (PKl) is one possible mechanism to allow interoperability
among enclaves. Security labels are used to preserve the source sensitivity
level of shared information.
Several architectural models for such cross-organisational access
management services have been developed at Columbia University by
introducing a broker service to consolidate and generalise access
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management. This service includes an Access Management Broker server
and a plug-in module for web servers [58].
As a part of the Stanford Digital Library Project and in the context of FIRM
(Framework for Interoperable Rights Management), a new architecture for
security and access control in heterogeneous network environment has been
prototyped. This architecture considers the security issues as relationship
management rather than information access control and as network-centric
rather than client-based or server-based. To support the idea of network-
centric they have introduced what they call commpact or a first class
relationship object. A commpact provides an encapsulated information
control and establishes a many to many relationship between itself and the
objects and the service that they control. The framework that was designed
in this work encapsulates the agreements, contract and other factors
between the participants in the form of commpacts which control the
communication services between them. Furthermore this work aims to
support the trusted shareability issue along with the privacy issue [67, 68].
All the works above are based on models discussed in 1.2 and 1.3.
Subsequently none of the above projects provide a complete framework to
fulfil important requirements of collaboration networks and multi-agency
applications, such as: need-to-know; limiting the use of information for a
specific purpose; responsibility tracing; authorisation management and
relationship.
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1.5. Multi-Agency environment
So far we have discussed models for applications that only deal with a single
security policy. Matters start getting harder as networks grow, applications
become more complex and society's reliance upon information technology
grows. This is reflected in the increase in collaborations between different
organisations that wish to share information for mutual benefit. These
organizations take advantage of the progress in information technology in
the last ten years (e.g. internet and WWW) that facilitate information
sharing. The demand for collaborative networks and the nature of some
applications that require multiple agencies to be involved in an integrated
network create a real security challenge. In such environment: ownership is
no longer static; responsibilities are difficult to trace; it is difficult to
determine who has right to access what, for how long and who is authorised
to decide about all these aspects.
1.5.1 Ownership and access right
In sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively, we have discussed security models and
access control. We note that all the above models assume the ownership is
definite and the authorisation is conventional (assuming that it is clear who
is authorised to have access to each object in the system). If you own
something, it means that it legally belong to you [Cambridge dictionary].
The right to own, right to access and to control are more or less political
issues. It is important to distinguish between the right to own and the ability
to own and the right to have access and the ability to have access. The right
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to own is what can be legally claimed. For instance a patient has a right to
own his/her medical record. The ability to own is about being able to take
the responsibility. For example the unborn child has the right to own
his/her personal data but will not be able to act as an owner for this data.
Moreover you are not always able to own what you have a right to own. For
instance you cannot destroy your medical record. The right to access is what
the regulation and rules support. For example you have the right to access
the information that is related to your safety at your workplace. Right to
access can be also claimed based on need-to-know as discussed further
below. The ability to access depends on the situation, so the access might be
granted or rejected. For example you have the right to gain access to your
medical record but your doctor may prefer not to allow that as it may affect
your treatment. Traditional access control such as DAC and MAC deals
with the capability to own and the capability to access. MAC enables the
system to own all the system's objects, while DAC enables the system users
to own part of the system's objects (e.g. those created by them) and allows
them to delegate this ownership. There is no framework to link the right
and the ability to own with that of access. This framework is crucial to deal
with security requirements for a multi-agency application, where ownership
is a dynamic property.
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1.5.2 Need to Know
Need-to-know is an important security aspect in a multi-agency environment.
This section attempts to introduce this term. In fact the need-to-know term
has been used to refer to two different aspects: the need-to-know as a claim
or requirement and the need-to-know as a basis for authorising an access to
confidential information.
Need-to-know as a claim/requirement:
Need-to-know can be briefly defined as a claim by individuals or an
organisation to know a set of information in order to carry out an assigned
job.
Need-to-know as a requirement/claim is defined in the American National
Standard 1 for Telecommunications as follows:
''Need-to-know is the legitimate requirement of a person or organization to know, access, or
possess sensitive or classified information that is critical to the peiformance of an authorized,
assigned mission, or the necessity for access to, or knowledge or possession of, specific
itiformation required to carry out ojJicial duties",
In health informatics the term need-to-know is used in the Department of
Health's draft Guidelines [31] as the basis on which disclosure of personal
health information to those authorised to receive it should be allowed [42].
Need-to-know as authorisation base:
Need-to-know as an authorisation rule, 1S to permit access to specific
information required to carry out official duties. The "least privilege" is a
principle to implement this rule [73].
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Although the need-to-know as an authorisation basis is common in military
systems, it is also considered in systems such as health care information
systems, for example principle 4 of Caldicott's principles and
recommendation. Chapter 5 discuss these principles and recommendation in
more details.
1.5.3 Multi-agency applications
A motivating example of an application that involves multi-agency services
is the Electronic Patient Record (EPR) or more general Electronic Health
Record (EHR). We could summarize our scope of health care security
requirements in two general, equally respected, goals:
1) Good quality of health provision (not only for a certain patient but for all
the society e.g. medical research requirements) and
2) Full respect for the patient rights. Actually, the main security
requirements are implicitly included in these two goals. For instance
availability and integrity are included in the first goal while confidentiality is
included in the second goal. It is understood that the first goal (good quality
of health provision) is relatively easier to achieve than the second one (the
patient's right). In other words the main concern is now given to the
patient's rights (fair and lawful use for patients' personal and medical
information).
I .\merican National Standard for Telecommunications Telecom Glossary 2000,
http://www.atis.org/tg2k/tl~2k.html).
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Ross Anderson in 1996 had developed a security policy model [11] to
address the security problem in the health information systems. Anderson's
model is known as the BMA model and particularly focuses on patient
confidentiality requirements. It is comprised of nine principles based on the
idea that access to a patient record will only be authorised in the presence of
a patient consent. This model is investigated in more details in Chapter 3
including verification of whether this model is sufficient for the multi-
agency security requirements in health care. The results of this investigation
are also published in [5].
The Dynamic Coalition IS another multi-agency environment, where
different parties are engaged ill a network to communicate and share
information. However a great challenge is facing these allies as they have
different interests, perform different functions using different approaches
and methods, and more importandy they operate under different policies
and often commanded by their own administration. Chapter 6 introduce the
DCE with a brief discussion for the active research in this area. We also
have used a DCE case study to demonstrate the functionality of our model
(see Section 6.2).
1.6. Our approach
In our work we investigate a number of problems. Why is security policy
implementation difficult, especially in the multi-agency service environment
where security policies come from multi-resources? Why is there almost
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complete agreement about policies but much more debate on the
implementations? Why is it difficult to resolve the conflicts that rise as a
result of different interests? Why are these regulations, principles and rules
implementable in real-life law systems and not in information systems?
An answer for the above questions could alleviate most of the security
difficulties and lead to a better understanding of the multi-agency
environment security problem.
In law, the principles give the overall policies. In particular circumstances a
lawyer would look further.
We make mistakes whenever we attempt to implement a general principle
for cases that are not necessarily the same when the full detail is considered.
It is easier to regulate a well-defined case. In our model, the twin protocols
allow collaborators/task's participants to use general principles to regulate
and control a specific task. In addition, collaboration, by definition, is based
on the needs of the collaborators from each other.
We have developed a task-based model, which we argue will alleviate
security difficulties in the multi-agency services and in the collaboration
networks.
Our model covers multi-agency difficult requirements such as:
• Relationship, responsibilities, authorisation, need-to-know, and
access control restriction (by time and purpose).
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1.6.1 Task-based approach literature review
We consider two aspects of our work. Firstly the extent to which task-based
approaches have been used before in security systems; secondly the usability
and computability of task-based approaches in the security area.
The task-based approach has been introduced before in a number of models
[34, 80, 81]. All were at the basic level of this approach. The focus in [80,
81] was on whether a task-based security model could be an alternative
authorisation and access control model to the subject-object traditional
authorisation models. While in [34] Fischer-Hubner and Ott tried to address
the privacy problem using the task-based approach. We intend in our
model to use all of the power of this idea (task-based approach) to address
the security problem of the collaboration networks and the multi-agency
services environment. In more detail:
The Group Security model (GSM) [80] by Steinke was described as a
security model, which provides access to information on the basis of a user's
task. However some features of GSM are already rather obvious in existing
information systems infrastructure. For instance in any relational database, it
is always possible to grant users/roles to functions, procedures, and
packages rather than grant them to the information objects (e.g. tables,
views). These functions, procedures and packages are in fact tasks and
group of tasks and also can be functionally minimized. GSM considers the
discretionary security approach to deal with ownership. Overall GS01 is
more suitable for hierarchical systems, where the responsibilities are visible.
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Thomas and Sandhu [81] introduced the task-based approach initially in
1994 as an approach to address integrity issues in computerized information
systems from an enterprise perspective. Subsequently in 1997 they [82]
developed their approach to produce a paradigm for access control and
authorisation management. The developed model is called Task-Based
Authorisation Control TBAC.
Fischer-Hubner and Ott [34] ill their model attempted to address the
privacy aspect using the task-based approach. The nature of the task-based
approach eases the handling of the main privacy requirements such as:
• Purpose binding: personal data obtained for one purpose should not
be used for another purpose without informed consent.
• Necessity of data collection and processing: the collection and
processing of personal data shall only be allowed, if it is necessary
for tasks falling within the responsibility of the data processing
agency.
In contrast to the models of Steinke and of Thomas and Sandhu, this model
takes a forward step to de-centralise the authorisation using a 4-eyes
principle. 4-eyes principle consists in performing an operation by one user
and confirming it by another one, both users should have sufficient rights of
access to perform this operation. However there were no end-user
requirements supporting this model and the 4-eyes principle is not enough
to ensure de-centralisation. The set theory which was used to represent this
model is not proven, nor is it in a framework (petri nets, Category theory,
LaSCO, Ponder, VDM, Z, ...) where proof is done by following constructive
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principles or through following rules guaranteeing a particular outcome.
Finally the Fischer-Hubner and Ott model does not include collaboration
requirements.
In 1990, Mahling, Coury and Croft [55] tried to build a task-based
collaboration model. However this work starts from a relatively late stage in
the negotiation where the plan, agreement and tasks are relatively clear. In
addition their work does not consider the case of the multi-agency
environments where the policies of the collaborators are different.
The state of the art is fragmented due to lack of cohesive and collaborative
research in this area. Researchers, by and large, are working independently.
Apart from Steinke's [80] citing of Mahling [55], no other cross-citation to
others in the field have been made.
We argue that the real challenge for the task-based approach is the multi-
agency services environment, where responsibilities are distributed and the
ownership is dynamic. None of the existing approaches have considered
the multi-agency aspects in detail. Furthermore the other issue of any
computer system design including security system is the usability [52]. This
issue was ignored in most of the above security models.
1.6.2 Other uses for the Task-based approach
Task Analysis:
Task Analysis (TA) IS a method in Human-Computer Interaction and
Software engineering. It is an analysis of tasks in terms of human behaviour.
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Historically TA was founded at the end of the sixties and was used to meet
training needs. There were a number of TA methods developed for this
purpose both in the UK and in the USA. The Hierarchical Task Analysis
(HTA) was the most successful method. HTA was developed by Annett and
his colleagues in 1971 [48].
The task analysis method (in H'Cl or training) was used to analyse an existing
task to figure out important points particularly in the human behaviour to
design a convenient computer interface or training courses to people [33,49,
50].
Task analysis has been mainly used for what is so called Task Analysis for
Knowledge Description (fAKD). As it stands, it is the opposite direction of
our approach, while we create a task this approach (fAKD) analyses an
existing tasks. However there could be a use of some methods of this
approach in our model where there is a need to create a task based on another
existing one.
1.6.3 Usability and computability
Usability and computability are almost equally important issues. It is not
sufficient for a computer system to be robust, dependable, and cover all the
expected functions (computability). It also has to be accepted by its users, in
other words it has to be user-friendly (usability). Social specialists and some
groups of information and computer specialists argue that the issue of
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"usability" has more to do with developments and implementations of
computer systems than their computability. Certainly the computer security
issue is not an exception from this rule. Indeed usability factors such as
politics, organization policy and rules, human behaviours and modes, groups
and individuals' interests are very much involved in the design of a secure
computer system. For instance a long and difficult security procedure may
affect the system availability and/or encourage users to skip some steps of the
procedure. In addition to its coverage of the issue of computability, our
model will also suitably fulfil the usability requirements since it considers
direct participation of the users. For example it is not necessary, in our task-
based model, to fully computerize a given task; it depends very much on the
result of the negotiation between the parties involved in that task.
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1.7. Thesis structure
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter :2 (next chapter) covers analysis
of the origin of security requirements. It includes general regulations such
as:
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. Data Protection Act,
and Medical Ethics such as:
1. Helsinki Declaration
') Council of Europe
3. BMA (Ross Anderson)
4. Caldicott
5. Debate about the above including.
a. Clause 67 Health and Social Care Act
b. The British Medical Association (Bi\L\')
c. Administrators at The National Health Service (NHS)
d. Other Groups
6. Patient Rights versus Public Interest
7. Consequences of computer use
,\t the end of Chapter :2 we discuss our findings from the analvsis and
review some related work.
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Chapter 3 covers formal analysis for an existing security model (B~L\). \\'e
analyze, in depth, the security model of Anderson using formal methods
based on security policy languages: ASL, LaSCO and Ponder.
This is followed by a discussion that raises issues such as the difficulty of
representing all the principles in a logical manner.
The conclusion of Chapter 3 includes a recommendation for our approach
that is task-based. This prospect is more likely to deal with the multi-security
security requirements that exist in medical applications and are not dealt
with in the BMA model.
Chapter 4 covers the development of our Task-based Security Model
starting with a review for security models with an emphasis on task-based
approach. The development of the CTCP /CTRP model and its two
protocols, the Collaboration Task Creation Protocol (CTCP) and
Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP), are discussed in detail
including representation of the CTCP and CTRP protocols using Petri nets.
A simple example is used to demonstrate the two protocols. It also covers a
discussion for the model capability of handing errors and exception. In
addition this chapter cover a discussion for the different approaches to
implement the model.
Chapter 5 reviews our model against the requirements, ill particular
reflecting principles in DPA and Caldicott against TCP /TRP.
Chapter 6 covers the work in the case study.
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Finally, in Chapter 7 we provide an overview of the work done, emphasize
our contributions and compare it with other related works.
The appendices at the end include additional detail on aspects such as: the
DPA principles and the Caldicott principles.
1.8. Conclusion and Contribution summary
Ross Anderson in his book Security Engineering [9] categorized security
models according to the way the data flow: vertically named .\lulli-Ievel
Security models (MLS) or horizontally named Multilateral Security Models (MSM).
Models such as Bell-Lapadula Model (BLP) [15], Harrison-Ruzzon-Ullrnan
Model (HRU) [43], Biba Model [16] and Clark-Wilson Model [24] were
listed as MLS, while Chinese Wall Model [17], lattice Model and British
Medical Association (BMA) [10, 11] were considered as MSM. Section 1.2
discusses them in more detail. Security requirements in a multi-agency
service environment come under Multilateral Security policy. However none
of the three models covers all of the multi-agency security requirements.
The lattice model shows how to isolate compartments but not to manage
information flow [9]. The Chinese wall model deals with one specific
security policy which is the conflict of interest. In addition the access rights
assignment is centralized. The BMA model is analysed and verified against
some of the multi agency requirements. Details of this study are discussed in
Chapter 3 and reviewed in [4, 5]. We argue that a task-based prospect
approach would properly deals with these requirements. A model based on
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this prospect was developed and verified with an example of medical
security principles and a real world case in health informatics. The
developments of the model and its testing with a simple example are
discussed in Chapter 4 and viewed in [2, 3]. Justification of health record
security principles through our model is discussed in Chapter 5 and
reviewed in [1]. Finally grounding of the model and its idea using a real
world case study from health informatics are discussed in chapter 6.
1.S.1 Contributions
The contribution of our work can be summarised in the following points.
We have:
• Looked at security in general including security policies, models and
mechanisms.
• Introduced multi-agency security requirements.
• Used health informatics requirement as an appropriate example for
multi-agency problem.
• Reviewed current declarations, legislation and regulations to bring
together a global, European and national perspective for security in
health services.
• Critically examined a British model, BMA, in formal terms using
graphical and constraint-based languages. Showed strengths and
weaknesses in handling security requirements. In particular need-to-
know was a significant omission from the B1L\ model.
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• Developed novel task-based CTCP/CTRP model based on two
linked protocols. Collaboration Task Creation Protocol (CTCP) was
used to establish a framework for handling a request for
information. Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP) was
used to run the request under the supervision of CTCP.
• Reviewed the model for technical completeness, satisfaction of
software engineering principles, completeness, focus, readability and
procedural transparency.
• Tested the model against two case studies, a simple one for
illustration purpose and a more complex one for evaluating the
model's coverage, neutrality and focus.
• Evaluated the overall performance of the model.
31
Chapter 2: Sources of Security Requirements
Chapter 2
SOURCES OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTI-AGENCY SERVICES IN
HEALTH CARE
2.1. Introduction
As introduced in Chapter 1 the security policy is the basis of computer system
security, and we have seen that security policy is derived from security
requirements. Indeed there is no single security solution and the security
definition depends on security requirements. Often security systems fail
because the security requirements were misunderstood or the wrong policy
was implemented. Security goals are relatively clear but we have to have rules
and regulations to meet these goals. These regulations are usually found to be
not enough or/and conflict with each other (see Section 2.5). The need for
new regulation and rules never stops. In our work we deal with security
management in a multi-agency environment. The Electronic Health Record
(EHR) is a good example of a multi-agency applications, as there are non-
medical bodies that claim to have right to have access to the patient
information. Moreover regulating the use of the patients' information is an
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active research subject. Security requirements in health care information
systems will be our security requirements example.
2.2. Security Requirements Resources
In business-oriented information systems, requirements are determined by
interviewing a single client. For instance techniques such as OMNIS [35]
have been particularly designed for handling the documentation and analysis
of such user requirement. Fundamentally, requirements come into view as a
result of the observation of existing systems along with information on how
to improve, add more functions/services or maybe change to a better
situation.
For requirements in general including those for security, the first stage of
requirements is often rhetoric, such as a complaint about services, a request
for new services or an invitation to react to environment changes or new
regulations. The second stage of the requirements takes the form of
statements/principles. These statements or principles aim to predicate the
general requirements in rhetoric and make them more specific and
appropriate for further developments.
In security systems the general rhetoric aims to achieve the three main
aspects of security: confidentiality, integrity and availability. In some
literature accountability is counted as a fourth aspect. However
accountability is not an objective in its own right. Rhetoric in this case is
regularly expressed as general security statements formally called a security
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policy or security regulation depending on the application. There could also
be concerns about existing threats to the system.
The concept stage in security requirements could be security principles,
security policy models or any revised version of security statements such as
official rules and regulations of an organization, ethical codes in a moral
network and beliefs of an individual or group. Ross Anderson [9] illustrates
general definitions, worth mentioning, for the security policy models along
with some examples including his model for the British Medical Association
(BMA).
In the following sections there will be a discussion of the better known
related regulation documents by international, European and local (UK)
organisations such as the United Nation, the Council of Europe, the World
Medical Association, the UK Parliament, the UK NHS and the British
Medical Association (BMA).
2.3. General data protection
2.3.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948-1998
Based on the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world, the
development of friendly relations between nations; the protection of human
rights by law and rules and the endorsement of the social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom on 10 of December 1948 the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) [85, 86]. UDHR, composed of 30
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articles, aims for a general standard for the protection of the human rights.
Since the personal data of a man or woman is a personal property, according
to article 17 he/she has the right to own this data and should be aware of any
use of this data. On December 1996 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession by the General Assembly resolution, and was entered into force 23
March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. This covenant comprises 53
articles of which the 30 UDHR articles are the first part. It should be noted
that the UK was among the countries that had signed this agreement.
2.3.2 Data Protection Act (DPA) 1984-1998
The first Data Protection Act 1984 [41] governs the processing (including
obtaining, storage, deletion, manipulation and disclosure) of personal data.
Personal data is any piece of information that refers to a living individual, who
is referred to as a data subject. DPA 98 supersedes the Data Protection Act
1984. DPA 1998 in its eight principles attempts to comply with human rights
declarations such as UDHR and particularly to implement the EC Directive
95/46/EC. The eight principles of the DPA 98 could be summarised
according to each principle as following:
Principle 1: the limit of personal data processing. This principle limits the
processing of personal data by an explicit consent from the data subject, or in
circumstances where consent cannot be obtained and the data process is
needed to protect the subject's vital interests or the processing is necessary for
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medical purposes and is carried out by a health professional or someone
whose duty of confidentiality is equivalent to that of a health care
professional. In general terms the personal data should be processed fairly
and lawfully.
Principle 2: limit personal data processing for specific purpose/purposes.
Personal data shall not be processed outside of the proposed
purpose/purposes.
Principle 3: processing only the adequate personal data.
Principle 4: processing accurate and up-to-date personal data.
Principle 5: limit processing personal data by specific period of time.
Principle 6: complying with the data subject's right under this act.
Principle 7: data protection and safety. Personal data should be protected by
all the measures available against unauthorized access and/or loss / damage.
Principle 8: Data £low control. Personal data should not be transferred to
another country, where there is not an adequate level of protection for the
rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal
data. For a complete list of DPA principles refer to appendix A.
2.4. Medical ethics
There are a number of official statements and principles from which security
requirements for health information systems can be derived. All of these
principles aim to protect the patient's sensitive information particularly
person-identifiable information based on the patient's rights. However it has
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been understood that some of these principles implicate high debates and
conflicts. As a result an implementation of this requirement was a difficult
task. In fact there are two general, equally rated, goals for health care services:
a good quality of health provision (not only for a certain patient but for all of
society e.g. medical research's requirements) and full respect for the patient
rights.
2.4.1 World Medical Association Declaration of HELSINKI 1964-2000
The World Medical Association (WMA) [92] in its 18th general assembly in
Helsinki on June 1964 has adopted the Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects, which is known as the WMA policy, or
the Declaration of Helsinki. This policy was later amended by the:
29th WMA General Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, October 1975
35th WMA General Assembly, Venice, Italy, October 1983
41st WMA General Assembly, Hong Kong, September 1989
48th WMA General Assembly, Somerset West, Republic of South Africa,
October1996 and the
52nd WMA General Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland, October 2000
The WMA policy comprises 32 principles developed to provide guidance to
physicians and other participants in medical research involving human
subjects including research on identifiable human material or identifiable data.
In principle 10, in which the duty of a physician in medical research is
considered, the privacy was valued as equal to the life, health and dignity of
the human subject. In addition principle 21 invites eyery precaution to
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respect the privacy of the subject and the confidentiality of the patient's
information.
2.4.2 The Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (97) 5:
The Recommendation No. R (97) 5 [26], which superseded the
Recommendation No. R (81) 1 on regulations for automated medical data
banks. R (97) was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 February
1997 at the 584th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. TIlls recommendation,
based on the general principle of data protection, asks the governments of
member states to ensure that the principles included in this recommendation
are reflected in their law and practice. The principles of R (97) attempt to
protect the automatic processing of three types of data: personal data, medical
data and genetic data. The principles that deal with patients' rights in this
recommendation can be summarised as following:
Principle 1 defines important terms such as personal data, medical data and
genetic data. Principle 2 represents the recommendations' scope. Principle 3
highlights the high respect for the privacy recommending that privacy should
be guaranteed during the collection and processing of medical data. Principle
4 regulates the patient data provision. Figure 1 illustrates the R (97)'s
conditions that control the provision of patients' data. Also in principle 4 an
unborn child owns his/her data although the holder of parental
responsibilities may act as the person legally entitled to act for the unborn
child. In addition principle 4 specifies two purposes for obtaining genetic
data. However these purposes are already included in the general condition of
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this principle. Principle 5 recommends that a data subject should be aware of
the use of his/her data. In the case of the data subject being a legally
incapacitated person the information should be given to anyone who can
legally act in behalf of the data subject. Data subject consent was considered
in principle 6 as it should be freely expressed and informed and once it is
obtained should not be exceeded particularly in the formulation of results for
a genetic data process. Comparing Figure 2, which illustrates conditions for
principle 7, with Figure 1, which illustrates those for principle 4 the only
difference is the condition dealing with the protection of the data subject's
right and freedom. Principle 8 lists the data subject's right, such as that to
have access to his/her data, and the exceptions where these rights are not
applicable, for instance the interests of protecting state security, public safety
or the suppression of criminal offences. Principle 9 recommends the
appropriate technical and organisation measures to be taken to ensure the
general data security requirements such as confidentiality, integrity and
availability. Principle 10 asks for a proper archiving system particularly linking
the data with the purpose for which they were collected and processed.
Principle 11 recommends certain conditions to control the data flow to states
where the recommendation R (97) or similar regulations are adopted.
Recommendations in the last principle number 12, give guidelines to control
the use of the confidential data in the scientific research.
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A request for medical data collection and/or processing
Yes
Yes
Yes
Collect and/or process medical data
Figure 1: R (97)'s conditions for controlling the provision of patients' data
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A request for medical data communication
Collect and/ or
process medical
data
Figure 2: R (97)'s conditions for controlling the medical data
communication
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2.4.3 BMA Security Policy Model 1996
As a response to the remarkable number of reports considering the low care
for the patients' privacy and the confidentiality of information in the medical
data processing, the British Medical Association (Bi\L\) invited Ross
Anderson, a reader in security at Cambridge University, to consider this
problem and prepare a security policy for clinical information systems (11].
Although some professionals in health care information technology believe
that any implementation of Anderson's principles would be expensive to
implement and unmanageable to maintain, others such as Denley and Smith
[30] according to their experience in the implementation of these principles in
three British hospitals: Conquest Hospital, Aintree Hospital and Royal Devon
and Exeter Hospital, state that Anderson's principles can be applied to the
electronic patient record to maximise privacy. However, the CEN (Europe
Committee for Standardization) group [83] observes that Anderson's model
is specified at too high a level for practical purposes and is not provable
complete because it is neither precise nor exhaustive. Cohen [25] has
proposed a formal model, complementary to Anderson's, which is again not
accepted by the CEN group because it is not shown to be complete and
because it is not based on basic security properties. The BMA model did not
consider the multi-agency security requirements and it was found that the
issue of sharing clinical information including collaboration activities with
other agencies such as police, social services or the education authority was
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not clearly considered. For instance the need-to-know problem was not
addressed in the BMA model, as the BMA does not accept that need-to-know
is an acceptable basis for access control decisions, although, as discussed in
Chapter 2 there are cases where need-to-know cannot be avoided. Chapter 3
covers this work in detail where the BMA model's principles were examined
logically by representing them using some selected languages for specifying
security policies.
2.4.4 Caldicott Principles 1998
A different approach was taken in the Caldicott principles, which can be seen
as specialisation of the DPA (Data Protection Act) for health care systems.
The Caldicott Committee was established by the Chief Medical Officer to
review all patient-identifiable information, which passes from NHS
organisations in England to other NHS or non-NHS bodies for purposes
other than direct care. The committee work aims to met requirements set out
in the Protection and Use of Patient Information issued under HSG(96)lS.
These requirements can be summarised in two points: 1) person-identifiable
information should only be transferred for justified purposes and 2) only the
minimum necessary information is to be transferred in each case. The work
of the Caldicott Committee resulted sIX principles and sixteen
recommendations.
For a complete list of the Caldicott principles and recommendations refer to
appendix B.
43
Chapter 2: Security requirements for multi-agency services in health care
2.4.5 Government Bills e.g. Health & Social Care clause 67 (2001)
As stated earlier in the introduction to this chapter the security policies keep
changing to cover gaps left by the active security policies or to protect against
new threats. However security vulnerability could be a result of a misplaced or
misinterpreted security policy in whole or in part. In health care all regulations
and security principles are supposed to support two main objectives: 1) a
good quality of health provision, not only for a certain patient but for all of
society (e.g. medical research's requirements) and 2) full respect for the
patient rights. These objectives often are used as a context to evaluate health
care regulation. Government bills are just an example. In health care the
controversial Health and Social Care clause 67 2002 [18] is the latest
regulation for the use of patient data. This clause attempts to empower the
Health Minister for the authorised collection and use of patient information.
2.5. Debate
Although all the above mentioned regulations deliberately aim to preserve
patient rights and to ensure good quality health services, their interpretations
imply conflict with each other and are repeatedly misinterpreted. As a result
much debate was raised immediately after each new declaration between
groups supporting different principles. In the following subsections there will
be a discussion of these debates. The debate can be summarized as a
discussion about overriding one patient right by public interest or vies versa,
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2.5.1 Patient right's side (e.g. BMA and Ross Anderson):
It is all about a balance between patient right and public interest such as using
patients' data (medical and possibly personal) in research. Ross Anderson and
his group are considered to fight on the patient side where they support their
arguments by documents such as the Declaration of Helsinki and the Council
of Europe Recommendation No. R (97) 5. The Anderson model for the
BMA is strongly on the side of the patient as it tries to control use of the
patient data by what is called patient consent. To keep the balance of power
in medical informatics, this group keeps arguing against all rules following
their model that gives more power for non-clinical bodies. Clause 67 was
criticized [13] by Anderson for tilting the balance of power in medical
informatics. In his comment about the Caldicott Principles, Anderson argues
that making the patient data available for non-clinical use will cause much
trouble and the use of NHS numbers as identifiers will not solve the problem
as the de-identified data problem will still exist.
2.5.2 Public interest (National Health Service NHS)
This is motivated by the intention to improve the health services
government's bodies such as the NHS. A number of regulations [18,20] have
been issued to give more power to non-medical staff. These regulations are
seen by patient rights defenders as violating the general human rights
declarations (see pervious section). However the patient rights were not
completely ignored in these regulations. The Caldicott Principles aim to make
the use of patient's identifiable information more secure so as to comply with
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patient's right. Nevertheless these principles were seen as not strong enough
to protect patient's privacy [8].
2.5.3 Further debate
Neutral directions exist such as those which argue that patient's privacy is
essential but that it should not be given more weight than the quality of care
and health status. An appropriate example for these directions is found in
[32]. Detmer's arguments can be summarised in the following points:
• There is still no existing law in USA to penalise for the
transgressions of medical privacy.
• Despite the European agreement about the personal data protection,
the practice varies widely between and within nations.
• International policies concerning this issue in Europe and America
are different and there is a need to resolve it but how?
• The major debate in personal information is resolved around the
practical meaning of privacy. (protection to be fair, useful and
enforceable)
• Health has been considered as both an intrinsic and an instrumental
good while privacy has been considered exclusively of instrumental
value.
• The tradition of individualism, loss of trust, and a recent weakened
concept of community are behind the legal problem of privacy.
• There might be a risk in the situation where the privacy is more
heavily weighted than the quality of care and health status.
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• The aim of the medical research is to improve medical care and
human health, so if there is any need for access to personal medical
information it should be allowed. (e.g. Sometimes you need to
differentiate between two patients having the same name).
• There is scant research data to support the above arguments and
almost all the available data is based upon public opinion.
• According to Harris-Equifax's survey only 30% of the American
population greatly valued privacy, 55% were willing to trade-off
privacy and 15% do not see what the issue is all about.
Detmer calls for research to address problems such as: patient's awareness of
the use of his/her medical information, protecting patient data from
unauthorised access and from misuse, and sufficiently penalising those who
falsely obtain or misuse medical records. However these problems are general
security requirements for any medical information systems.
Such arguments were implicitly supported by Den Hoven [88]. In addition he
highlights the need for balancing between the improvement of the health care
and privacy. Detailed studies for all sides of the problems are essential.
Donald Willison [91] in a contribution to Detmer's argument focuses on how
to ensure that researchers will not misuse the personal information rather
than forbid any access to that information.
2.5.4 Balancing patient rights with public interests
The World Medical Association Declaration on the Rights of the Patient
(WMA) explicitly states: in its first principle (Right to medical care of good
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quality) that every person is entitled to appropriate medical care. This means
that all possible measurements and mechanisms should be deployed to
achieve the best possible health quality not only for individuals but for all
society. Equally the patient right to confidentiality was considered (Wl'-L\
principle 8). Although this principle calls for protection for all patient's
identifiable information and for their disclosure only if the patient gives
explicit consent, it does allow disclosing information on a "need to know"
basis.
Other examples are found in regulations such as the Recommendation No.
R (97) 5 (section 2.3.2), where Principle 3 emphasizes the high respect for
privacy recommending that privacy should be guaranteed during the
collection and processing of medical data. However principle 4 regulates the
patient data provision in that it allows the disclosure of patient information
in cases such as: considering public health, preventing real danger,
suppressing criminal offence, preventive medical purposes, safeguarding the
vital interests, contractual obligations and/or any other legal claim. ;\ similar
example is found in Caldicott principles (section 2.3.4) and Health & Social
Care clause 67 (section 2.3.5)
2.5.5 Confidentially threats in comprised medical record
Information technology (I1) significantly helps to improve the quality of
health care in the everyday administration and clinical work at the primary and
secondary heath care units. For instance it might be used for easy patient
registration, patient diagnoses, prescribing ... etc. It helps in long term medical
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plans and projects such as medical research as it provides tools and
techniques to make the most of the collected data in reasoning about existing
diseases or to find a cure. There is a cost in preserving patient's rights
including patient's privacy. Nevertheless as there are techniques to make data
available so there are others to protect it, though this is not an easy task.
Computers have made it easier to bring data together for research purpose
but against this patients are worried that their details will be readily publicised.
2.6. Conclusion
Security requirements can take different forms: declarations,
recommendations, rules and principles. The requirements and originate
from a different level of authorities: local (e.g. Caldicott recommendation),
national (e.g. DPA), regional (e.g. Council of Europe recommendations)
and international (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948
and Declaration of Helsinki).
Capturing multi-agency security requirements is a difficult task as:
• The security requirements originate from different resources and
takes different forms.
• There is no standard to interpret security requirements.
• Security principles and regulations are too general.
• Security principles and regulations are inherited from each other and
may give rise to conflict.
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• There is a lack of models and frameworks ID which conflicting
security policies can communicate.
Electronic health record security requirements can be summarised into the
following points:
• Patients have the right to own their medical, personal and genetic
data, and to be aware of any use of this data, and when possible their
consent should be sought before any new authorisation is granted.
• For society, heath and safety are vital hence the data of individuals
can be obtained in restricted cases such as: considering public
health, preventing real danger, suppressing criminal offence,
safeguarding vital interests, preventive medical purposes, contractual
obligations and/or any other legal claim
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Chapter 3
FORMAL ANALYSIS FOR EXISTING SECURITY POLICY MODEL:
BMA
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter we will discus a security policy model for a clinical information
system and investigate whether logical languages can represent the principles
of this kind of model. We have used three security logical languages: the
Authorization Specification Language (ASL), a Language for Security
Constrains on Objects (LaSCO) and Ponder: a Language for Specifying
Security and Management Policies for Distributed Systems. ASL focuses
more on the access control policies and LaSCO attempts to express
constraints on objects, while Ponder aims to specify security and management
policies for distributed systems. Additionally they are different from the
language's character point of view. Whereas ASL is based on logic and
LaSCO policies are specified as logical expressions and as directed graphs,
Ponder is a declarative language inheriting its syntax from the OCL "Object
Constraint Language". We will also study whether these principles are
sufficient to deal with the case of multi-agency services and sharing
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information with the different agencies such as social services, police and
education authority.
For economy of expression and to make it easy for readers to link with
Anderson's model, we will assume that the clinician is female and the patient
male.
The intent of the security policy model for clinical information svstems
proposed by Ross Anderson [10, 11] is to allow the British Medical
Association (BMA) to meet security requirements of the electronic patient
record (EPR) and to be the base of any proposed system claims to operate the
EPR. Anderson's model is composed of a set of principles based on a
statement found in the Good Medical Practice booklet issued by the General
Medical Council (GMC), which says:
Patients have a right to expect that you will not pass on any personal information,
whichyou learn in the course rfyour professional duties, unless thry agm.
This raises the following questions. Is a patient/patient's guardian qualified
enough to give consent and be aware about all the consequences that could
accrue in future including security threats? For instance some patients
consider their clinician's instructions as a part of their treatments and must be
obeyed. Are ordinary patients usually familiar with how their information
could be used in future? Despite his guardian's help, the patient may permit
an action that may consequently lead to security threats. For example patients
with a little knowledge about the abuse of clinical information will assume
that to reject giying consent is safer. \X1hois responsible in case a patient died
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as a result of rejected consent? Nevertheless a patient may find himself forced
to give a consent that authorizes other agencies to gain access to his medical
record in order to obtain a particular service: for instance [38] to claim for a
reimbursement for the cost of a visit to the doctor in cs. There are also
many examples in the UK For instance, from your insurance company, you
need to complete a form that includes the following part
I authorize af!Y pbysiaan, hospital, or other medical related facili!J, insurance
compaf!Y, or other organization, institution or person, that has a'!Y record or
knowledge of me or my dependents, or our health to disclose, when ever requested to
do so i?Y CAN or its representatives, af!Y and all such information. A photocopy of
this authorization shall be considered as effective and valid as the orilinaL
3.2. The Model's Principles
Nine principles were defined by Anderson (10, 11]. These are given below
with comments on obvious difficulties in their implementation.
Principle 1: Each identifiable clinical record shall be marked with an access control list
naming the people or groups ofpeople who mqy read it and append data to it. The .rystem
shall preoen: af!Yone not on the access control list from accessing the record in af!Y wqy.
Principle 2: A clinician mqy open a record with herself and the patient on the access
control list. Whm a patient has been nferred, she mqy open a record with herself, the
patient and the nferring clinician(s) on the access control list.
The clinician-may-open-record clause ill principle 2 makes this principle
difficult to be logically represented. It can be only understood as the
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following: a clinician must open a new clinical record associated with a new
access control list for a patient if the new information appears to be hidden
from users who already have access to this patient's clinical record unless this
principle is not needed to be formally implemented. There should be, at least
a measurement/mechanism to find out whether a clinician was right by
opening/ not opening a new medical record for a patient according to her
judgment about the security level of the new information.
Principle 3: One oj the clinicians on the access control list must be marked as being
responsible. OnlY she mqy alter the accesscontrol list, and onlY she mqy add other health care
professionals to it.
Let us consider the case where the responsible clinician is the only authorized
user to alter the access control list for a certain clinical record. For instance
she forgets her password or deletes her record from the access control list,
which means losing access to the access control list of that clinical record.
Who is going to make the access control list available again? We may assume
that a new access control list has to be created for that clinical record to
replace the inaccessible one and/or that there will be another higher level of
security such as system administrator. However this assumption is against the
goal of principle 3, which is based on the responsible clinician being the
highest security level for a certain clinical record unless the super
authorization (e.g. system administrator) might be made as an exception
comparable to the accident and emergency staff authorization. The second
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part of the confusion concerns the technical experience of the position of the
responsible clinician at network level Is it operating system level, middleware
level or application level? Definitely it is going to be impracticable for a
clinician to manage control on all these levels, so her control will be at one
level, which very likely will be at the application level. Logically the levels
beneath compromise security mechanisms at any higher level. For instance
the security mechanism from the application level can be bypassed, as the
operation system is hosting the applications.
Principle 4: The responsible clinician must notij} thepatient of the names on his record's
accesscontrol list when it is opened, of all subsequent additions, and whenever responsibility
is transferred. His consent must also be obtained, except in emergenry or in the case of
statutory exemptions.
Principle 5: No one shall have the ability to delete clinical information until the
appropriate timeperiod has expired.
Principle 6: All accesses to clinical records shall be marked on the record with the
suo/ect's name, as weil as the date and time. An audit trail must also be kept of all
deletions.
Principle 7: Information derivedfrom recordA mqy be appended to recordB if and onlY
ifB's accesscontrol list is contained in A's.
Principle 8: There shall be effectivemeasures toprevent the aggregationofpersonal health
information. In particular, patients must receivespecial notification if a'!Yperson whom it is
proposed to add to their accesscontrol list alreacfyhas accessto personal health irformation
on a large number ofpeople.
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Principle 9: Computer D'stems that handle personal health information shall have a
subD'stem that enforces the above principles in an effective wt!Y. Its effectiveness shall be
suo/ect to evaluation f?y independent experts.
The apparent manual nature of principle 9 makes it unsuitable to be
represented by the logical languages. For this reason we will assume that it has
no part to play in the following sections.
3.3. Using security logical languages to represent Anderson's
Principles:
Three languages are assessed in turn for their effectiveness m handling
Anderson's principles: ASL, LaSCO and Ponder.
General Definitions:
Some important definitions need to be stated before we start using a logical
language to represent a security policy:
Closed Policies (positive authorizations):
An access is granted if there is an authorization stating that the user can
access the object.
Open policies (negative authorizations):
A user can access any object unless it has been explicitly denied.
An access control policy is a set of rules defining what is authorized.
An access control mechanism is a policy implementation to ensure that all
accesses are in accordance with the underlying policy.
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3.3.1 The Authorization Specification Language (ASL):
Definitions and an overview:
ASL [47] is a language for expressing the authorization according to access
control policies. ASL supports a model based on two elements, an object (0)
which could be a file or directory in a operating system or table in relational
database, and an authorized entity who could be a user (C), group (G) or roles
(R). An authorization policy in ASL is a mapping that maps -l-tuples (0, 11,R,
a) to the set {+, -}, where 0 is an object, 11 is a user, R is a role and a is an
action (access rights such as read, write and append), while + means
authorized and - means denied.
ASL Rules
An authorisation rule has two sides: the left hand side is the rule itself and the
right hand side is a condition that controls the rule and is either another rule
or binary predicate such as:
Active: binary predicate to capture the concept of active rule/s for users. It
takes two arguments, the first is a user and the second is a role.
III and dirin: binary predicate to capture direct and indirect member
relationship between subjects. They take two arguments, both are subject.
Tjpeof. binary predicate to capture the grouping relationship between objects.
It takes two arguments the first is an object and the second is an object type.
ASL is designed principally to express the following rules:
Authorization Rules: used by the System Security Officer (SSO) to allow or
deny accesses to objects explicitly in the following form:
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cando(o,s, <sign>a) f-- Lt & .... &Ln
This predicate symbol states that a subject s can (Positive authorization sign =
"+'; or cannot (negative authorization sign = "_'; perform the action a on the
object 0 under the conditions specified by Lt& ..&Ln. Lt ,... , Ln could be
one of the following literals: in, dirin or typeof. Principle 1 in the following
section is an example of this rule.
Derivation Rules: used to derive implicit authorizations from explicit
authorizations and determine the authorization policy. Indeed they are for
expressing propagation of authorization along a subject's hierarchies. In
addition derivation rules can express some kinds of implication relationships
such as the derivation of an authorization in the base of the presence or the
absence of other authorizations. The derivation rule has the following form:
dercando(o,s, <sign>a) f-- Lt & .... &Ln
The right hand side of this rule derives a positive or negative authorization
The outcome is determined by <sign> for a subject s to perform the action a
on the object 0 according to another authorization in the right hand side
(Lt & ...&Ln ). Lt , ... , Ln could be one of the following literals: cando,
dercando, done, do, in, dirin or typeof.
Resolution Rules: used to regulate how to resolve any conflict that could
accrue between authorizations are specified by the authorization rules cando
and dercando as in the following form:
do(o, s, <sign>a) f-- Lt & .... &Ln
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This form states the enforcement of exercising (if sign = +) or forbidding (if
sign = -) an access on an object by a subject s in the case of a conflict in the
authorization rules (cando or dercando) in the right hand side.
Access Control Rules: to be used to regulate access control decisions on the
basis of authorization specified by the authorization rules.
Access control rules have the following form:
grant(o, u, rs, <sign>a) f- Lt & .... &Ln
This form states that a request submitted by a user u with active roles R to
perform the action a will be allowed (sign = +) or forbidden (sign = -)based on
an authorization condition on the right hand side Lt & .... &Ln. Lt & ....
&Ln are either cando, dercando, done, do, in, dirin, or typeof
Integrity Rules: used to express different kinds of constraints on the
specifications and the use of authorizations. An integrity rule is of the form:
errorOf- Lt & .... &Ln
where Lt & .... &Ln are either cando, dercando, done, do, in, dirin, or typeof
This rule derives an error every time the conditions in the right hand side of
the rules are satisfied.
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Using the authorization language (ASL) for specifying the clinical
security principles:
Principle 1:
A subject s can read from and write on a clinical record diJ/cal_recordif and
only if she is in the access control list Clinical_Record_ACL (here called a role)
of that record.
The following IS simply an authorization rule. The left hand side part
(cando(clincal_record,s, +read/ wnte)) is the authorization that is to be given and
the right hand side part (in(s, ClinicaI_Record_ACL)) is specifying conditions
that must be verified for the authorization to be granted.
candoidincalrecord, s, +read] umte} f- in(s, Clinical_Record_ACL)
Principles 3 and 4:
The following code states that a subject patient must read his access control list
Clinical_Record_ACL if it has been appended by a subject clinician who is
authorized to do so
cando(ClinicaI_Record_ACL, clinician, +append) f- do(ClinicaI_Record_ACL ,
patient, +read)
cando (CiinicaI_Record_ACL ,patient, +read) f- done (CiinicaI_Record_ACL,
clinician,append) f- cando (Ciinical_Record_ACL, clinician, +append)
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Observations:
ASL is a language for expressing the authorization in matter of allowing or
denying an access to an object. There is no way to express consequent actions
that should be carried out after some authorized access such as auditing
operations (e.g. principle 6). In addition it is not clear in this language how to
express authorization restricted by the number of accesses as is needed for
controlling the aggregate access problem (e.g. principle 8).
3.3.2 A Language for Security Constraints on Objects (LaSCO):
An overview:
LsSCO [46] is based on a model where a system consists of objects and
events. The attributes on an event denote the specifics of the event's
execution. Policies in LaSCO are stated as policy graphs which describe a
specific state of the system (domain) and specific access constraints
(requirements). Predicates are annotations near the nodes (objects) and the
edges (events) to describe the domains (in the graph written as bold style text.
For example Type="user" and Method="access" in Figure 3 are
descriptions of domains. Requirements are written in the graph as normal
style text, for example $UID E ACL. LaSCO uses variables called poliry
variables. A policy variable represents a value of an attribute and relates
attribute values associated with different objects and events. Variables may
appear as operands in domains (e.g. in figure 1 ID=$UID) and in
requirement predicates (e.g. in figure 1 $UID E ACL). They are denoted by a
"$" prefix.
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Using LaSCO to describe the clinical security principles:
Principle 1:
The policy graph 111 figure 1 indicates that a user/subject needs to have
his/her/it ID represented by the policy variable SLID included in the access
control list of the clinical record in order to have an access to it, that is SLID
E ACL.
Type="user" &&
ID=$UID
Typ e="r ecor d/file" &&
Name="clinical record"&&
ACL=$ACL
Metho d=' 'a ccess"
$UID E ACL
Figure 3: a security policy graph to represent principle 1 of the clinical
security policy.
Principle 2:
If the user's security level! clearance, represented by the policy variable SLL, is
not the same as the clinical record's security level, represented by another
policy variable $FL, a clinician may create a new clinical record with the new
access control list as shown in Figure 4. The requirement is that the security
levels are different (SUL * $FL).
Typ e="user" &&
Name="clinician" &&
Clearan ce=$U L
Type="record/file"&&
Name="clinical record"&&
Security Leve1=$FL
Method=" create"
$UL"" $FL
Figure 4: a secunty policy graph to represent principle 2 of the clinical
security policy.
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Principle 3:
The policy graph in Figure 5 states that a user, represented as an object, which
is stated by a set of attributes rype and position in addition to policy variable
$ID, can only append the access control list for a clinical record if she is
marked as responsible clinician. The event is represented in the policy graph
as a method with value "append". The domain is represented as an object,
which is stated by a set of attributes rype and name. The requirement is that the
ID of that user has to be the value of the attribute called responsible_clinidan.
Type="user"&&
position ="clinician" &&
10=$10
Type="Secret fIle"&&
Name="Access Control List
MEthod="ann end II
resp onsi ble _clinician = $ID
Figure 5: a security policy graph to represent principle 3 of the clinical
security policy.
Principle 4:
Since principle 4 includes two events under different restrictions, we will
divide it into two principles. Principle 4a considers the part that says the
responsible clinician must notify the patient of all subsequent additions to the
names on his record's access control list when it is opened. Principle 4b
considers the part that says, whenever responsibility is transferred, the
Patient's consent must also be obtained, except in emergency or in the case of
statutory exemptions.
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Principle 4a:
The policy graph in Figure 6 specifies the first part of principle 4 by restricting
the method add to be executed after the method message. Both add and message
are events and the restriction is ensured by a security requirement that
enforces the order of these two events (Time> $5T). So adding a new user to
the access conttollist will not be allowed until a message is sent to the patient
containing the name of the user who it is proposed to add to the access
conttollist of his clinical record.
Type="user"&&
Name="patient"
Typ e="user" &&
Position=" R_clinician" &&
NoA=$count
Time> SST
Figure 6: a security policy graph to represent the first part of principle 4 of
the clinical security policy.
Principle 4b:
The policy graph ill Figure 7 specifies the second part of principle 4 as
following: the event change responsibility is restricted by either the case is an
emergency or the other event Name="Consent" && Pennit=$PM has been
performed and the consent has been given, that is SPJ1=true I I
Case= "emer;genry".
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Type="user"&&
Name="patient"
Type=''u~'' &&
Position="R_clinician" Type=" Secret me"&&
Name="ACL"
Name="Consent" &&
oI----p-er-nu-.-t=$-P-M------l.~O Metho .... "'~ .. , ......... ility.. -0
$PM=true II Case='emergency'
Figure 7: a security policy graph to represent the second part of principle 4
of the clinical security policy.
Principle 5:
The policy graph that is shown in Figure 8 states that event delete can he called
by a subject to delete a clinical recordobject if and only if the system date I!ysdate,
a policy variable, is greater than or equal to the expiry date of that clinical
record $Edate, another Policy variable.
Type="subject"
Type="recordlme" &&
Name="clinicalrecord" &&
Expiry date=$Edate
Mlthod=" delete"
$sysdate >= $Edate
Figure 8: a security policy graph to represent principle 5 of the clinical
security policy.
Principle 6:
The policy graph that is shown in Figure 9 specifies principle 6 by ensuring
that a log record to be created contains a subject id ($SID), the access date
and time ($DT), the access id ($ADID), and the accessed clinical record
($RID) for any access to the clinical record instance.
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Type="m.bject"&&
Id=$SID
Type=I'RecordlFlle"&&
Name=" Clinical_record" &&
Rec_id=$RID
Type="class"&& 0
Name="/::Adit"
AUDS=true
O 0 Type=''file''&&)- ..... Name="log"&&Record e SSID v $DT v
$ADID v $RID&&
Audited=$AUD
Method="access"&&
Date_time=$DT &&
Accessid=$AD ID
Figure 9: a security policy graph to represent principle 6 of the clinical
security policy.
Principle 7:
The policy graph that is shown in Figure 10 represents the information flow
control by ensuring that the access control list for the source record is a
subset of the access control list of the destination record, that is $ACL_B E
$ACL_A.
Note that: this principle IS also implicitly shown 10 the representation of
principle 1.
Typ e="fUeirecord" &&
Name="clinical_record" &&
ACL=$ACL_A
Type="fi1e1recordl'&&
Name="clinical_rec ord II&&
ACL=$ACL_B
O~------$-~-C-L-_-B-e--$~-C-L-_-A----------_'''O
Method="transfer"
Figure 10: a security policy graph to represent principle 7 of the clinical
security policy.
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Principle 8:
The policy graph, shown in Figure 11, states that adding a new user to the
access control list of a patient's medical record is not allowed before a
message is sent to the patients. This message informs them that the user who
it is proposed to add to their access control list already has access to personal
health information on a large number of people such that NoA > n. i\TOA is
the number of accesses for the proposed user and n is a constant.
Note that the order of the two events is enforced by ensuring that the time of
the add method is greater than the time of message method, that is Time >
SST.
Type="user"&&
Nam e= "patient"
Typ e="user" &&
Position ="R_clinician" & &
NoA=$count
Type="S ea-et file" &&
Name="Access Control List
Time> $ST
Figure 11: a security policy graph to represent principle 8 of the clinical
security policy.
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3.4. A Language for Specifying Security and Management
Policies for distributed Systems (Ponder):
Definitions and an overview:
Ponder [28] is a declarative and object-oriented language that includes
constructs for specifying the following basic policy types:
• Authorization policies specify what activities a subject is permitted or
forbidden to do. In other words specifying either positive (auth+)
and negative (auth+) authorization policies is possible. Principle 1 in
the following section is represented as a positive authorization while
principle 5 is an example of the negative authorization.
• Obligation policies specify what activities a subject must do. These
policies are triggered by events and are usually interpreted by a
manager agent. An example of this type is found in principle 2.
• Refrain policies define actions that subjects must refrain from
performing.
• Delegation policies define what authorizations can be delegated and
to whom.
• Composed policies are used to define a syntactic scope for specifying
a set of related policies. There are four types of composed policies:
groups, roles, relationships and structure management.
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• Meta policies specify a permitted value for a valid policy.
The reader of this chapter will note in the following section that all
Anderson's principles fall into two types of security policies, authorization
policies and obligation policies, because these principles attempt to restrict the
access control and/or enforce consequential actions such as the auditing
process.
Using the Ponder language to describe the clinical security principles:
Principle 1:
A subject s of type user is authorized to read and/or append the clinical record
rif and only if s is in the access control list of the clinical record rACL where
rACL is the access control of the clinical record r.
Note that type is a type definition introducing a new user-defined policy type
from which one or more policy instances of that type can be created, auth+
is a reserved word indicating that the following is a positive authorization
policy and princzple1 the name of the policy type. subject<user> s means that
s is a subject of type user, target <clinicalRecord> r means that r is the target
object of type clinical Record to be accessed by the subject s. action is a
reserved word followed by the action, read and append, that is needed to be
authorized. belongs is a user defined function to check whether the subject s is
a member of the access control list of the record r. If so the positive
authorisation will be allowed, that is result = enable;
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type
auth+ principlel (subject <user> s, target <clinicalRecord> r)
{
action read, append ifbelongs(s, r.ACL)
{
result = enable;
}
}
Principle 2:
In the case of new clinical information for a patient New Information appears to
be in a different security level isDiJferentSecLevel. From the existing access
control list cunCfinica!RecordAd a new access control list newCfinica!RecordAd
has to be created
Note that on is a reserved word followed by the obligation condition, and
isDiJferentS ecLevef is a user-defined function to compare the new information
against the current security level and check whether it is a different security
level. In this case the mandatory action has to be performed, that is do
createNewACL(newClinicalRecordAcl)).
type
oblig principle2 (subject <responsible_clinician> s,
target <ACL> currf.Iinicalkecord.Acl,
newf.linicalkecord.Acl,
<ClincalData> newinformation)
{
on isDifferentSecLevel (currClinicalkecordocl, NewInformation);
do createN ewACL(newClinicalRecordAcl));
}
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Principle 3:
A subject s of type clinician is authorized to alter and/or append the access
control list of a clinical record clinica!RecordAci if and only if s is marked as a
responsible user in the access control list.
type
auth+ principle3 (subject <clinician> s, target <ACL>
clinica~ecordAc)
{
action alter, append
if position(s, clinicalkecord.Acl) = "responsible"
{
result = enable;
}
}
Principle 4:
This principle is divided into two parts. The first principle 4a concerns
informing the patient about any new addition to his clinical record access
control list via the responsible clinician. This part is represented as follows: in
case of adding new record atidNew to a patient's access control list of his
clinical record clinica!RecordAcl, then that patient has to be informed through
the action informPatient.
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type
oblig principle4a (subject <responsible_clinician> s,
target <ACL> clinicallcecord.Acl, clinician new.vame)
{
on addNew (newName, clinicalkecord/rcl);
do informPatient (newName);
}
The second part of this principle (principle 4b) deals with the case of
changing the responsibilities in the access control list of the clinical records.
This part is represented as follows: a subject s of type responsible clinician will
be authorized to change the responsibilities in the access control list of a
patient clinical record if and only if he has obtained that patient's consent.
type
auth+ principle4b (subject <responsible_clinician> s, target <ACL>
clinicalRecordAcD
{
action changeResponsibility if PatientConsent (clinician,
new Responsibility) =true
{
result = enable;
}
}
Principle 5:
A subject s cannot delete clinical record r until this record has expired, that is
todayDateO > expiryDate(r).
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Note that when is called the authorization filter and is used to restrict an
action by a given condition.
type
auth- principleS (subject s, target<clinicalRecord> r)
{
action delete;
when todayDateO > expiryDate(r);
}
Principle 6:
An audit record contains the subject identifier s, date aDate and time aTime of
action, type of action aTYPe, and the record that has been accessed r: All
accesses on the clinical record r by a subject s must be recorded.
type
oblig principle4 (subject s, target <clinicalRecord> r)
{
on allAccess (s, aDate, aTime, aType, r);
do createAuditRecord (s, aDate, aTime, aType);
}
Principle 7:
Transferring data from clinical record A to clinical record B is not allowed
unless all records in the access conttollist of b clinicalRecordAcI_B are included
in the access conttollist of a clinicalRecordAcI_A.
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type
auth- principle7 (clinicalRecord A, <ACL> clinicalRecorcL\cl_A,
<ACL> clinicalRecordAcl_B, target<clinicalRecord> B)
{
action transfer(a.data, b.data);
when List( clinicalRecordAcl_B) In
List( clinicalRecordAcl_A)
}
Principle 8:
In the case of adding a new record which grants a new user access to a clinical
record through a patient access control list, then the patient has to be
informed of the number of records to which the new user has access.
type
oblig principle8 (subject <responsible_clinician> s,
target <ACL> clinicalRecordAcl, clinician newName)
{
on addNew (newName, clinicalRecordAcl);
do informPatient (newName, getNoAccess(newName));
}
3.5. Results
The results are discussed in three ways. Firsdy we compare the efficient uses
of the formal approaches. Secondly we look at the coverage in Anderson's
principles of multi-agency environment security. Finally we comment on the
need-to-know problem.
74
Chapter 3: Formal Analysis for existing security Policy model: B~L\
3.5.1 Comparisons of formal approaches
Although all the above languages are basically targeting the specification of
security policies, they focus on different aspects. For instance ~\SL focuses
more on the access control policies and LaSCO attempts to express
constraints on objects, while Ponder aims to specify security and management
policies for distributed systems. Additionally they are different from the
language's character point of view. Whereas ASL is based on logic and
LaSCO policies are specified as logical expressions and as directed graphs,
Ponder is a declarative language inheriting its syntax from the OCL "Object
Constraint Language". According to the nature of each one of these languages
we have found that some of Anderson's principles are not directly
representable. For example principles such as those dealing with auditing
operations (e.g. principle 6) and control aggregation problems (e.g. principle
8) were not representable at all by ASL and could be only indirectly expressed
by LaSCO. On the other hand Ponder was more suitable for these kinds of
principles since Ponder has got forms to deal with the management policies.
Table 1 illustrates the comparison between these three languages according to
their ability to express Anderson's clinical security principles.
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~
ASL LaSCO Ponder
Principles
Principle 1 Explicidy represented Explicidy represented Explicidy represented
Principle 2 Not applicable Indirecdy represented Indirecdy represented
Principle 3 Indirecdy represented Explicidy represented Explicidy represented
Principle 4 Indirecdy represented Indirecdy represented Explicitly represented
Principle 5 Not applicable Explicidy represented Explicidy represented
Principle 6 Not applicable Indirecdy represented Explicitly represented
Principle 7 Not applicable Explicidy represented Explicidy represented
Principle 8 Not applicable Indirecdy represented Explicidy represented
Principle 9 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Table 1: Comparison of how far the ASL, LaSCO and Ponder languages
can represent Anderson's principles.
3.5.2 Multi-agency services environment and collaboration issue
Only limited forms of cross-organizational access control were considered by
Anderson[10, 11]. Such aspects include principle 4 that requires informing the
patient about any addition to his record access control list and principle 6
concerning the auditing aspects. In general the issue of sharing clinical
information including collaboration activities with other agencies such as
police, social services or the education authority were not considered [62].
One possible reason could be that these principles were derived from a
centralized system viewpoint at least from the responsibilities and ownership
point of view.
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3.5.3 Need-to-know problem
Need-to-know was not included in Anderson's principles, as the B~L\ does
not accept that 'need-to-know' is an acceptable basis for access control
decisions. Further details may be found in [10, 11]. However there might be a
case where the need-to-know cannot be avoided. For instance a service
provider such as social services offers its services conditioned by some
information about the patient who applies for such services. There are two
major problems in this case. Firsdy who is authorized to decide about who
needs to know in a multi-agency services environment where responsibilities
are distributed. Secondly how can we resolve the conflict between the
patient's consent and the need-to-know? Since there is no need-to-know
without a purpose (task), we propose an approach based on associating the
data with tasks and granting these tasks to performers rather than giving
direct authorization to the secret data. The task could be in the form of an
agreement between the information's owner and who needs to know (task's
performer). 'Ibis agreement would consist of full awareness about the task
that requires the information, information size, release time, time of expiry
and a guarantee to restrict the use of this information to the specified task.
For a definition of "need-to-know" refer to Section 1.5.2
3.6. Concluding Discussion
Anderson in his security policy model [10, 11] argues that a security solution is
an issue requiring great care to ensure that the security mechanisms work
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together rather than operate independently. Although some professionals in
health care information technology believe that any implementation of
Anderson's principles would be expensive to implement and unmanageable to
maintain, others such as Denley and Smith [30] according to their experience
in the implementation of these principles in three British hospitals (Conquest
Hospital, Aintree Hospital and Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital) state that
Anderson's principles can be applied to the electronic patient record to
maxirruse pnvacy. However, the CEN (Europe Committee for
Standardization) group [83] observes that Anderson's principles are specified
at too high a level for practical purposes and are not provable complete
because they are neither precise nor exhaustive. Cohen [25] has proposed a
formal model, complementary to Anderson's, which is again not accepted by
the CEN group because it is not shown to be complete and because it is not
based on basic security properties.
Our work contributes to the solution of the clinical information systems
security problem by discussing Anderson's security principles for the clinical
information systems, examining then logically and representing them using
some selected languages for specifying security policies.
The ease with which the principles can be represented in a logical framework
varies considerably. For example principles such as those dealing with
auditing operations and control aggregation problems were not representable
at all by ASL and could be only indirectly expressed by LaSCO. On the other
hand Ponder was more suitable for these kinds of principles since Ponder has
got forms to deal with the management policies.
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Anderson's principles are mainly applicable to centralized systems. There were
no precise principles in this model concerning either the multi-agency services
environment or the need-to-know problem. The latter was not rated of high
priority by the BMA. We consider that a task-based approach is promising in
developing a need-to-know policy and on the next chapter introduce our task-
based model. Other aspects of security in multi-agency services are still being
investigated. CEN [83] also plan to broaden the model of security 10
healthcare to include all the potential needs of the different participants.
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Chapter 4
DEVELOPMENT OF TASK-BASED SECURITY MODEL
4.1. Introduction
As introduced in section 1.2 basically security systems are built out of the
available mechanisms to meet a security policy based on a selected security
model [39]. Most of the security models that were designed subsequently were
targeted at a specific security requirement. For instance multi-agency services
and collaboration networks are based to some extent on these general models.
However all these models are dealing with a single policy, whereas by
definition the multi-agency and collaboration environment involves more
than one policy.
A motivating example of an application that involves multi-agency services is
the medical information services. The only model designed to meet the
confidentiality requirements for the medical records in the UK was the BMA
(British Medical Association) Security Policy Model [10, 11]. This model is
examined in this thesis (see Chapter 3) [4,5] against the multi-agency security
requirements and it was found that the issue of sharing clinical information
including collaboration activities with other agencies such as police, social
services or the education authority was not considered for policy reasons. For
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instance the need-to-know problem was not addressed in the Bi\L\ model
(Chapter 3). However there might be a case where need-to-know cannot be
avoided. For instance a service provider such as an insurance company offers
its services conditioned by some information about the patient who applies
for such services. An example is given in [38].
This Chapter covers a discussion for the proposed security model that we
argue will alleviate the security difficulties that may arise in attempts to build a
collaboration network. The model is constructed from a task-based
perspective, as this approach seems to offer the best way forward (see Section
1.6). The general principles of the model are discussed and a diagrammatic
representation is devised. Two task-based collaboration protocols, expressed
in this chapter in the form of Petri Nets, represent the permitted states and
transitions. An example of informal collaboration is used to illustrate the
application of the model. Finally the model implementation is discussed.
4.1.1 A Task-based Perspective for Collaboration Networks
A collaboration business, by definition, is based on the needs of the
collaborators from each other. Each side needs information or a service from
the other participants. The obvious question that someone will immediately
ask before he/she releases any confidential information or responds to an
enquiry is: What for? For what purpose is the information required? Usually
the expected answer will be the naming of a task for which the information
required is essential, sometimes with a further explanation of the benefit of
this task for the two sides (collaboration proposal). The information owner
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may like to restrict the use of this information by some conditions (security
policy). If they reach initial agreement a detailed negotiation will then take
place until they reach a considered level of trust, which leads to a
collaboration agreement to perform the task One reasonable condition might
be to limit the use of the information by other tasks. For instance it could be
specified that the information should not be used outside the task for any
purpose.
We have decided to build our model as a task-oriented model for the
following reasons:
1. Fundamentally any collaboration scheme is based on specific tasks:
there is no collaboration without a task.
2. The task-based approach is promising to address the need-to-know
problem, satisfying a user requirement in any multi-agency services
environment.
3. The collaboration task 1S the common object between the
collaborators.
4. Shared information ownership can be granted to the collaboration
task.
5. The task is scalable, flexible and dynamic.
6. Explicit responsibility is recognized in the task-based approach.
Overall the basis for any collaboration is an aim to share resources in order to
achieve common benefits by performing shared operations. Other task-based
approaches to security are discussed in Chapter 1.
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4.2. General principles for our Model
4.2.1 Collaboration
In our model we consider any deal/trade between individuals or groups
which aims to benefit the sides involved is a kind of collaboration. The
following are some forms of collaboration:
• Trading between customers and service providers.
• Joint operation projects
• Research group collaboration.
• The clinician and the patient trade/relationship: the clinician's job
exists because of the patient, and the patient needs the clinician for
treatment. So both need each other and benefit each other. The
clinician may need to know some information from the patient as part
of the course of treatment. The relationship is in general based on
trust. In this example there are two sides trading benefits through the
task named treatment.
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4.2.2 Ownership
Ownership is considered as a political issue and it is not only difficult to
model but even more difficult to define who owns what. The following
ownership aspects are to be understood well:
• Right to own: fundamentally according to the general principles of
freedom and human rights such as the General Declaration of
Human rights 1948 an individual or group reserve the right to own
their properties including personal information.
• Ownership limitation: nevertheless an individual ownership IS
occasionally limited for the community/nation's benefit.
• Regulation effect: granting or limiting the ownership 1S based on
regulation by the law.
• Ownership delegation: to meet the law and regulation requirements
the ownership can be delegated but under explicit principles and for a
specific purpose.
An item of information, in this model, is owned initially by its natural owner
that is the person to whom the information relates. For instance information
about the baby is owned by the baby although this information is controlled
by guardian/parents. In computer security terms this is called grant access or
delegation. Once this information is required to be shared among collaboration
parties, an access will be granted to what we call the collaboration-task and will
be controlled by the task-polig. The information owner and/or the access
controller will be part of the negotiation that results in the task policy.
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4.2.3 Authorization
There will be no absolute access by subjects on objects as in the traditional
access control models. A subject to gain access to an object needs to
participate in a collaboration task; hence we called it tase-paniapan: The task-
participant will be granted an access to object(s) for limited time to do specific
job (called task-activity). The specification of the granted authorisation is
explicitly declared in the taskpolifY.
4.2.4 Responsibilities
All responsibilities should be explicitly defined in the task policy in the way
each individual collaborator/taskparticipant knows their responsibilities such as
the required duties, the rules to follow (including ethical codes), the
limitations (e.g. time, use of material and information) and the penalties.
4.3. Collaboration task characteristics
The following properties are required for a collaboration task:
• Unique: it is identified by the following components and change in
any of them results in a new task:
o Task Purpose/requirements: the task should aim to achieve
explicit requirements and for a specific purpose.
o Task Policy: is a set of enforceable rules that regulates task
participants' duty (who is going to do what, when and for
how long). A task policy can be inherited from other policies.
85
Chapter 4: Development of Task-based Security Model
o Task participants: could be physical entities such as people
and computer programs/processes or logical such as roles.
Although the collaborators are usually task participants, there
could be others who will participate in the runtime.
o Flexible: can be a single activity or group of activities sharing
same policy, covering same requirements and carried out by
same task participants system.
o Dynamic: can be updated even while it is running (supporting
post-hoc justification). For instance a nurse can be replaced
by another one if he/she is not, for any reason, able to
complete his/her duty in a surgical operation. However any
change in the task elements should be fully and carefully
documented. To secure accountability.
o Secure: should be appropriately protected usmg all the
available mechanisms.
o Scalable: can be upgraded, for instance to fill some gaps in the
original task. A new collaboration task can be built starting
from default tasks (task template).
o Accountable: all collaboration protocol states and all task run-
time events of the collaboration must be well documented.
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4.4. Diagrammatic Representation of Model
The architecture in Figure 12 illustrates the general components of our model
The main component is the collaborators (two or more), each of which will
need to define three elements: requirements (what does he/she/it/they aim to
gain from the other side), policy (rules that need to be obeyed) and material
(e.g. information to release or services to offer). The second component is a
pair of task-based collaboration protocols -- the Collaboration Task Creation
Protocol (CTCP) and the Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP), both
detailed later in the following sections.
CTCP includes a negotiation between all collaborators where the proposed
task will be discussed including all collaborators' policies and requirements.
This process (negotiation) continues until a decision is taken either by
rejecting the proposal or by accepting it. The acceptance of a proposal will
lead to a formal agreement/contract, which will produce the proposed
collaboration task in its final stage including all of the policies and
requirements.
The task policy will move from a high level through the negotiation, decision
and agreements stages to a low level at the task creation stage. Classifying
security policy as high level and low level policies are discussed with examples
in [59].
87
Chapter 4: Development of Task-based Security Model
DDDB
Collaboration Task Creation Protocol CTCP
Collaboration task
Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol CTRP
Figure 12: general architecture for secure collaboration environment
CTRP will start after a successful compilation of CTCP and as scheduled .in
the task_poliry (not necessarily immediately after the end of CTCP).
The main function of CTRP is to process the task that was previously created
by the CTCP protocol and ensure that the task_poliry is obeyed, the
collaborators are aware of the circumstances and the right action is taken.
CTRP is detailed in the following sections. In a special case of the abnormal
termination of the task process the collaborators may need to go back to the
CTCP protocol to create an alternative task. It should be noted that the
task_participants (collaborators) are not necessarily the same subjects who were
participants in the CTCP. However such differences should be included in the
task_poliry. The case of an emergency update for the participants list during
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the CTRP will be covered by the CTRP process documentation (the CTRP
log).
There is another way to view the CTCP / CTRP relationship. CTRP is verv
variable and its form is not predictable. It depends on what policy was agreed_
CTCP can be regarded as the intension of the policy and CTRP as the
extension. There is the normal intension-extension relationship, that is an
instance in the extension must be consistent with the definition of the
intension, here the security policies agreed. This is procedural transparency in
contrast to the situation if one protocol were used.
(Requirements, recourses, policy) * No of
Decision
Rethinking
Dismiss
Negotiation
Create
Col-task
Figure 13: Petri Nets Graph representing the Collaboration Task Creation
Protocol (CTCP)
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4.5. Notations for Protocols
4.5.1 Selection of Formal Approach
There are a number of notations available for representing our model such as
flow charts; state charts; state machine; data flow diagrams; entity life-
histories; Petri nets; process algebra; process calculus and pi calculus.
The notations need to represent the events and processes. The actual choice
is not critical for this work as the main thrust of verifying the model is to be
the case studies and the validation against the regulations. Formal semantic
verification is much more difficult as it requires detailed knowledge of the
applications and a substantial amount of formal analysis outside the scope of
this thesis.
We choose Petri nets for their suitability here as they provide 1) a
diagrammatic representation; 2) facilities for syntactic verification; 3) methods
for functional decomposition by nesting one net within another; 4) state-
transition capture; 5) concurrency control; 6) constructively, we know how a
Petri net will behave given particular inputs.
Not all these features have been used immediately but it is clearly
advantageous to use a technique, which can be readily extended to capture
more meaning rather than discard the results and recommence with a
different notation. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a thorough
comparison of the above notations. Nor is it claimed that the Petri net
approach is the only valid option.
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Petri net theory was originally introduced in a PhD thesis of C. _-\.Petri and
Reisig [65] introduced it to the software engineering area in 1985. More recent
advances in this formalism are described in [66]. The usefulness of Petri nets
in providing a theoretical basis for handling object life cycles has been
demonstrated by Van Der Aalst and Basten [87]. The Petri net in Figure 13
represents the CTCP protocol. The Petri nets shown in this thesis have been
verified syntactically by the PEp2 tools.
4.5.2 Petri Net Notations
A Petri net, usually represented as a graph, contains four elements: transitions,
places, arcs, and tokens. A transition is drawn as a bar or a box. A place,
drawn as a circle, contains zero or more tokens. A token is a black dot
represents argument or return value. An arc, drawn as a directed line,
represents an input-output relation between a place and a transition (see
Figure 14).
D Transition
0 Place
~ Arc
• Token
Figure 14: Petri Net Notations
2 PEP is a Programming Environment based on Perri Nets
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The initial state represents the ann ":- each collabc :.':~: including
requirements, policies and ()iier' For instance. in the parienr-docrv-
collaboration, the patient's requirements are treatments. the patient's p,.hcy l'
to keep personal information secret, the doctor's reqUlremem, may include
information about the patient and the doctor's "iter 15 a treatment COV'l
The-e aspects will be initially discussed as teJwhether the r.i-k (at rlr" an nite r
from one side or a requirement from another 15 .ICCl)'flli as an e ,iier or
rejected without any further details. '11K /lilmdi/,/!"': rran-rn. .n will not include
discussion about the policies. If the prop,,'ed t.. -k IS t',.und to be rca-«mablc
then all collaborators will enter into a detailed ':'<"/- 1:'",: m which all :l'j1t'ct,
including requirements, sen-ices and I" .hcrcs will be clan tied for .rll
collaborators. After that one of three dccrsion« will be UKCrl the r-lf,r optlon
could be that one of the collaborators need, me .rc nme i" think about the
task/offn; the second option could be that the C:'I1CLtnllevel ()t- trust could
not be ensured so the task IS SU11ph-dismissed: the third e 'prlon b rlur all
collaborators trust each others so that an ;l,l!:l"eerl1L·ntbetween all collabor.i« If'
will rake place, 'nus agreement at the end will be formulated In what we call
the collaboration task. This task will be limited m scope by the u'*- 1'",.),
which is a composition of all collaborators' policies, meeting all sides'
Chapter 4: Development of Task-based Security Model
Init Process
Assessment
Update CTCP
Figure 15: Petti Nets Graph representing the Collaboration Task Run-time
Protocol (CTRP)
The Task Runtime protocol (CTRP), illustrated in Figure 15, starts after the
task has been completely created by the CTCP protocol and when its
schedule time, according to the tase-policy, is due. Before starting the process
of the task some tasks need some preparations. Then the task process starts
following the policy that has been approved in the CTCP stage. Each state of
this process is monitored, assessed (verified against the task-poliry) and then
documented. The task assessment may result in one of the following:
1. The task is proceeding satisfactorily, following the policy and the plan
and has not finished yet, so the task should persist.
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2. The task needs an update to meet its requirements. Depending on
how the updates affect the process: the task may restart or continue
from the last state of the process.
3. The task reaches its scheduled end, hence the task terminates
normally.
4. There might be a case where the task abnormally terminates, for
instance the task-poliry has been violated, or the task exceeds the
scheduled time without valid reasons. The abnormal termination
could lead either to the end of the task and then of the collaboration
or to a new session of the CTCP.
4.5.3 Using Security Languages to review the CTCP/CTRP model
In Chapter 3 we attempted to use security languages to represent the BMA
principles. It is clearly important to also review the CTCP /CTRP model in
terms of these security languages. Here we will demonstrate how these kinds
of languages are applicable in our modeL As these languages are only usable
when there is an explicit security policy available, they cannot represent the
open-ended nature of the CTCP /CTRP modeL The security languages do not
cover negotiation, decision and agreement. After the agreement stage in the CTCP
protocol they could be used, particularly in the task creation stage. Hence the
task policy or part of it could be written in one of the security languages such
as Ponder, LaSCO or ASL. However fundamentally as the authorisation
policy is task-based, none of these languages is suitable for representing the
authorisation in a task policy as they are all subject-object based. In our model
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there is no absolute access to the object by the subjects either authorised or
authorised.
However, in the CTRP protocol particularly in the tase assessment, PO~DER
in particular can be used to enforce the task policy. The following example
uses the obligation policy in PONDER to enforce a task police for a task
activity
oblig activityOl Policy (subject s,
target anObject)
{
on policyViolation;
do TaskAbort);
}
4.6. Example of Informal Collaboration
Let us consider a situation of a son asking his father for some cash:
4.6.1 The Collaboration Task Creation protocol (CTCP)
Introduction:
Son: father, I need 20 pounds [35].
Father: what for?
Son: to buy a book. [purpose]
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Father: well I do not have enough cash and I cannot drive to the ATIl at the
moment. [Initial discussion]
Son: Would you please lend me any of your cards (Debit or Credit) with the
PIN, so I can go myself? [proposed task]
Negotiation:
Father: well, you understand that you will not use this card for any other
purpose, you will not withdraw more than 20 pounds, and you will not give
away the card or its PIN to anybody else [7].
Son: Yes, I do understand that [accepting policy].
Decision:
Father based on his experience with his son will go for one of the following
three options:
1. Take more time to think about the matter and to ask more questions.
[Back to negotiation],
2. Cannot trust his son, so he cannot give him his card. [Dismiss the
task], or
3. Trust his son and give him the card [commit the task].
Agreement:
• Father: I agree to give you my card along with the PIN but
you should remember that:
1. You return the card to me within 20 minutes of
obtaining the money.
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11. You will not withdraw more than 20 pounds and you
will not use the card for any other purpose.
111. You will use the money to buy a book.
IV. You should not give the card nor disclose the PIK to
anybody else.
V. This agreement is based on trust between us.
• Son: Yes, I do understand all these conditions.
Rejection:
Father: I will go myself later to obtain for you the money that you want.
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•
Introduction- {Son's requirements = "20 pounds cash",
Purpose = "to buy a book",
Proposed task = ''borrow credit/ debit card"}
Negotiation: Father's policy = {withdraw only 20 pounds,
...--_---* not to use the card for any other purpose, return the card
after getting the money, not to give it away}
Decision= trustworthy or not
Mistrustethinking
Trust
Agreement {son can get the card, obey the policy,
punishment would never get such help in the future}
Discard= {father may go
himself to get the money}
Create Col-task
Figure 16: Petri Net representing the CTCP of the given example
4.6.2 The Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP).
Preparation:
Farther: Explains to his son how to use the card and gives it to him.
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Task process:
Son takes the card and starts using it.
Task assessment:
Father watches the time, maybe checks his account with another card if it
takes more time than expected and takes decisions accordingly. Meanwhile he
updates his relationship of trust with his son in the light of this experience.
4.6.3 Example modelling:
In this example we have two collaborators (task-participantl=son and task-
paticipant2=father), task_name = borrow credit/ debit card, purpose = withdraw
20 pounds to buy a book, poliry = {withdraw only 20 pounds, not to use the
card for any other purpose, return the card after getting the money, and not
to give it away}, and security-base= {trust based on experience}. A Petri Net
graph in Figure 16 represents this example in the CTCP layer/stage and
Figure 17 represents it in the CTRP protocol.
99
Chapter 4: Development of Task-based Security Model
Father: hand out his card to his son
Father's experience
1> Father decides to send his
daughter to follow his son.
2> Son brings the card back and gets
only £20.
Figure 17: Petri Net representing the CTRP of the given Example
4.7. Exception and error handling
As it is almost impossible to design a 100% secure and dependable system
and as there will always be exceptions and errors, systems need to handle
exceptions and errors as they arise to meet most possible dependability
situation (including security requirements).
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Logically we cannot wipe out the errors and the exceptions because we are
always going forward but we can remove the result of that error, in other
words no backward recovery for security (e.g. unauthorised access to secret
recourses). Backup and recovery usually helps availability and integrity but not
confidentiality. As the time will never go back, handling errors and exceptions
in our model is based on insertion of a new activity/process . A task is a set of
activities, so if any exception is raised in an activity, another activity will be
inserted after this activity to handle the exception.
In the CTCP / CTRP model exception and error will be treated as any other
violation for the task policy, hence exception and error handling are built in.
The CTCP / CTRP model, particularly the CTRP protocol, complies with the
Protect-Monitor-Response approach [76] where the task assessed against
task_poliry responds to any policy violating security deliberately (task
participant misuse, an external attack) or accidentally (errors and exceptions).
The task activities are protected by the task_poliry (established in CTCP
protocol and encapsulated with the task) and monitored by the task
assessment component in the CTRP. In case of any error, exception or policy
violation the response will be one of the following:
• Update the task and resume.
• Update the task and restart.
• Terminate the task and go back to the CTCP protocol to negotiate a
new task where the experience gained (task process log) will be used
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to create a new task and resolve problems raised in the process of
before. See Figure 18.
• Terminate the task and stop.
Collaborators in the CTCP / CTRP model learn from their mistakes to create
more dependable tasks.
4.7.1 Exception/error handling scenario
To demonstrate the exception handling in our CTCP /CTRP model we will
consider simple scenarios (more challenging ones are found in the case
study in Chapter 6):
• Signing an official letter/memorandum can be an activity in many
tasks (let us assume it is an urgent letter/memorandum). The
authorised person(s) may not be available at the time. This exception
can be handled as following:
1. If the system policy contains a principle to regulate an acting
authorisation and indeed the acting authorised person(s)
is/ are available. This scenario is covered in the CTCP
protocol where principles such as assigrung acting
authorisation are included in the task_poliry. In the CTRP
protocol in case of such an exception the task will be
automatically updated to authorise the acting authorised
person to sign the letter/memorandum and resume the
process of the task.
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2. If neither the authorised person(s) nor the acting authorised
is/ are available, the system policy may include principle to
state a higher authorisation to overwrite, in emergency, any
authorisation. As this is a major change in the authorisation
policy, so the task will need to restart from the beginning to
ensure constancy. though this case is manageable in the
CTRP protocol.
3. However there could be situations where none of the above
is granted. In such situations an initiative action by one of
the responsible people (task_participants in CTRP) is required
to resolve the situation. This attempt however must properly
be recorded and audited. Such action results in a new
authorisation, which was not in the pre-defined policy. This
means the task fails to work with the agreed policy, which
means a new task is required to handle this situation.
However the new task will use the record (task process's log)
of the original task to meet the original requirements and to
avoid repetition.
4.7.2 Authorization Scenario:
The commandos team X3076, which is lead by General X has been
commanded to carry out an intelligent operation somewhere abroad. To
communicate with the headquarter General X is equipped with a laptop
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computer including sophisticated software and encryption tools. Just after the
operation started, General X is shot dead. Security policy of the operation
advises that Major Y may act as leader in the absent of General X. :'-.lajorY
turns the laptop on and attempts to login as a leader. The server rejects his
login as for the system General X is still in charge. This is in fact an exception
raised by the system. An action is urgendy needed to handle this exception.
The problem in the view of the CTCP / CTRP model:
Using the Collaboration Task Creation Protocol, the National Intelligence
Headquarter (NIH) has a number of tasks created to perform a number of
operations as required. The above is just one example.
Collaborators: (The Prime Minster, the Minster of Defence, Agents, Officers
... etc) will participate in the creation of the task and its policy (Rules of
engagement).
Task design: from the introduction through the negotiation to the
agreement and final creation of the task (compiling the result of the above
processes).
Task Creation: All the task activities are set up, all the task participants
(General X, Major Y, etc) are named and associated with their roles. The
participant in this task will not necessarily will be the same people involved in
the creation of the task (e.g. the Prime Minster will have no roll here).
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Running the Task:
After the task has been created and the time for running that task is due, the
Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP) starts. In the middle of the task
process, while the task assessment component was verifying an activity
supposed to be done by General X, the ID and the password were not
General X's. This for the system is a policy violation, despite the fact that
General X is dead and Major Y is the acting leader. Such an exception can be
handled through the update component as follows:
Major Y logs on as normal user and sends a message to Headquarter. The
message may include a video showing General X has died as evidence.
The Headquarters send a message to General Y and ask for a quick response
If there is no response from X the Headquarters will insert a new activity to
update the task, so Major X is authorised as team leader.
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4.8. Implementation guide lines
Intentionally we avoid proposing any mechanisms to enforce the protocols'
components for the following reasons:
1. There is no single mechanism to meet all the security requirements
(see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2).
2. Security implementation depends on security goals and policy.
3. Our model is task based and each task is regulated by a task policy
that is prepared especially to meet security requirements for a specific
task.
However to show the practicality of the approach the following sections
cover a discussion for available mechanisms that can be adopted to
implement the protocol's components in given scenarios, also we give below
some Java interfaces to demonstrate simulation of the model.
4.8.1 The Collaboration Task Creation Protocol
The following are some examples of mechanisms that can be used with some
cases to implement the CTCP protocols' components.
Introduction: advertisement is an example of mechanisms, in the case of
service-provider-customer scenario. In the case of a doctor-patient scenario a
visit to the clinic is a mechanism example.
For simulation purpose, the following is a Java interface for the Introduction
component.
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public interface Introduction
{
public boolean collaboratorRegistration (Collaborator newCollaborator,
Policy policyList, Requirement requirementsList)
throws IOException;
public boolean collaboratorWithdraw (Collaborator collaborator ToDelete)
throws CollaborationDeletionException;
public boolean lookup (String CollaboratorName)
throws InvalidN ameException;
public void policyUpdate (Collaborator collaborator, Policy newPolicyIist)
throws IOException;
public void requirementsUpdate (Collaborator collaborator,
Requirement newRequirementsIist)
throws IOException;
public boolean considerTheProposal 0 throws notEnoughInformation;
public Boolean getLog 0 throws IOException; / / used in the case that the
task is based on a previously run task
}
Negotiation: there are many formal models and techniques offering different
ways to address the negotiation problem. For instance there are a number of
Artificial Intelligence models that can be deployed for aspects such as conflict
resolution [23, 94]. Work in process by a team in OASIS (Organization for
the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) aims to specify
asimple process by which collaboration protocol agreements can be
negotiated between patties [44]. Tools such as E-meeting (e.g. net-meeting),
discussion groups (e.g. news groups) and email services can be used to put
collaborators together.
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For simulation purpose, the following is a Java interface for the negotiation
component.
public interface Negotiation
{
public Tasklnstruction negotiation 0 throws NegotiationException;
public void addTaskParticipant (TaskParticipant newParticipant)
throws InvalidParticipantException;
public void policyUpdate (Collaborator collaborator, Policy newPolicyList)
throws IOException;
public void requirements Update (Collaborator collaborator,
Requirement newRequirementsList)
throws IOException;
}
Decision: often the negotiation models and protocols include a decision
method. There is much software developed to support decision making.
ERGO [14] is one example. It is a decision support system designed by
Arlington Software Corporation to help users organize their decision criteria
and their related priorities.
The following is the proposed Java interface for the decision component for
simulation purpose:
public interface Decision
{
public boolean decision (TaskInstruction initTask) throws
DecisionException;
}
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Agreement: 1S the final form of the task design stages (introduction to
agreement).
Agreement is usually considered by the negotiation models and protocols,
hence they usually offer methods and techniques to support it. There are a
number of protocols that aim to meet some agreement between collaborators.
An example is found in Collaboration Protocol Profile and Agreement
(CPPA) [61].
In the case that the task is a computer program the result could be a program
specification and compilation script.
The following is the Java interface for this component.
public interface Agreement
{
public agreementScript agreement (faskInstruction initTask) throws
AgreementException;
}
Task creation: depends on the language used. For programming languages, it
is the program compiling and linking.
The created task could be formed in a list of instruction along with another
list of regulation (task policy) for each individual task participant by their task
activities.
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For different tasks different languages can be used. For instance we have
introduced (see Chapter 3) three security policy languages (ASL, LaSCO and
Ponder) and we have seen each of these targeting different security properties.
For example if the task security policy is to deal with authorization and access
control, anyone of these three languages (perhaps, these issues were more
clear in ASL) will be suitable but if the policy includes constraints LaSCO will
be preferable, while Ponder deals better with policies, which include
aggregation control.
The following is the Java interface for the task creation component, the last
one in the CTCP protocol:
public interface TaskCreation
{
public Task taskGeneration (Tasklnstruction initTask, makeFile make File)
throws GenerationException;
}
4.8.2 The Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP)
Task process and assessment could be as simple as comparing one action
against one straight forward security principle (e.g. Boolean operation). On
the other hand it could be very complicated for instance including
sophisticated algorithms and techniques to capture human behaviour.
However in all cases the result must be the same.
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Using Ponder to implement the task assessment:
In Chapter 3, we have used three security policy languages to represent the
BMA model's principles, subsequently in Section 4.5.3 in this chapter we have
seen that it is possible to use these languages particularly to represent the task
polices. For example the obligation policy in ponder can be used to
implement the process assessment.
type
oblig processAssessment (subject <taskParticipant> s,
target <taskResource> processResource)
{
on errorOrException 0;
do
{
createLog 0;
exception Handling 0;
}
}
4.9. Conclusions
This chapter has introduced a task-based model to facilitate collaboration in
trusted multi-agency networks, after a wide inyestigation of the existing
security models dealing with the multi-agency environment and collaboration
networks. Our model is based on the fundamental aspect of the collaboration
environment, which has a task-based perspective. Two task-based
collaboration protocols (CTCP and CTRP), expressed in the form of Petri
112
Chapter 4: Development of Task-based Security Model
Nets, are used to represent the permitted states and transitions. Also security
policy languages such as Ponder can be used to represent the task-policy. The
model's capability of errors and exceptions handling is demonstrated and
supported by examples. An example of informal collaboration is used to
illustrate the application of the model We have also discussed the extent to
which task-based approaches have been used before in security systems. In
addition to its coverage of the area of computability, our model suitably
covers the usability requirements. Finally a number of mechanisms are
suggested as implementation methods for the different components of the
model's protocols.
113
Chapter 5: Review of Model against Requirements
Chapter 5
REVIEW OF MODEL AGAINST REQUIREMENTS
Satisfaction of Health Record Security Principles through Collaborative
Protocols
5.1. Introduction
The CTCP / CTRP model developed in Chapter 4 and so far tested with one
informal example. In this chapter after a brief discussion for the security
requirements, the model is reviewed by showing how it handles the
principles of two British approaches (DPA and Caldicott). These two
regulations are carefully selected to cover both general regulations (DPA)
and more specific health informatics regulations (Caldicott principles and
recommendations). Finally the effectiveness of the CTCP /CTRP model in
software engineering terms is reviewed. It is shown that the model exhibits
maximal cohesion, loose coupling and an economical rule-based performance
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5.2. Security requirements for the health care information
systems
5.2.1 Rhetoric
We could summarize our scope of health care security requirements in two
general, equally rated, goals: 1) a good quality of health provision (not only
for a certain patient but for all society e.g. medical research requirements)
and 2) full respect for the patient rights. Actually, the main security
requirements are implicitly included in these two goals. For instance
availability and integrity are included in the first goal while confidentiality is
included in the second goal. It is understood that the first goal (good quality
of health provision) is easier to achieve than the second one (the patient's
right). In other words the main concern is now given to the second goal. In
this work we will try to alleviate those difficulties that could prevent the
health providers from achieving this important goal.
5.2.2 Confidentiality in heath care services: (patient's right
requirements )
With respect to the patient's rights, recent legalisations and publication in
the field support five important aspects:
1. Patient oriented approach: an item of information about a patient
should be owned by the patient described by the information.
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2. Privacy: patient privacy should be maintained to a high standard as
a result of fair and lawful use of the patient's confidential
information.
3. Transparency: the patient should be made aware of all the use made
of his information.
4. Public interest: the need of the community may override the need
of individuals in some exceptional cases.
5. Legal requirements: a trial case may require disclosure of a patient's
confidential information. However this should be very restricted
and limited by the case after detailed explanations of why the
information disclosure is essential.
It is important here to mention some mechanisms that have been
introduced to deal with these requirements so far, summarized as follow:
• Patient consents:
1. Expressed consent to ensure the patient's ownership.
11. Informed consent to ensure transparency.
ill. Implied consent to deal with emergencies or protect
the patient's health when expressed consent may be
difficult to achieve.
• Anonymisation/Pseudoanonyrnisation: to resolve the
conflict between public interest and patient's right
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5.2.3 Concept
There are a number of official statements and principles from which
security requirements for health information systems can be derived. All of
these principles aim to protect the patient's sensitive information,
particularly person-identifiable information based on the patient's rights.
However it has been understood that some of these principles result in
much debate and conflict [8, 32]. As a result an implementation of this
requirement is a difficult task. We will look at two accepted approaches: the
Data Protection Act and the Caldicott Principles and Recommendations.
These two approaches are both relevant to security in health care services.
The Data Protection Act is the general law of Britain for controlling the use
of personal data and the Caldicott Principles are an attempt to develop a
specific means of controlling access to personal information in health
services in the context of general British law and the culture of the health
services. Both of the documents underpinning the approaches give lists of
principles.
5.3. Data Protection Act
The Data Protection Act (DPA) [41, 69] is an implementation of the EC
Directive 95146IEC, which aims to protect the processing of personal
information by 'data controllers'.
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The DPA has been summarised into eight principles, which are discussed in
the following paragraph with an attempt to examine how far these principles
can be reflected in our CTCP / CTRP model:
5.3.1 Principle 1:
Personal data shall be processed fairlY and lawfullY, and, in particular, shall not be
processed unless (a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and (bJ in the case
of sensitive personal data at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.
In our model sensitive data including personal data will be processed
through a pre-defined task. This task is defined and created as a result of a
collaboration protocol which in one of its steps involves negotiation
between all parties, such as data subject (patient in EHR), service providers
(who needs the information e.g. clinician, social worker), referee (optional,
e.g. data controller) and legal agent. Table 2 shows how the conditions in
Schedule 2 of this principle will be meet by our model.
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Condition
Patient consent
How to be meet in our model
Since the patient or his/her guardian
is part of the negotiation, which has
created the collaboration task, so he
or she has got the right to allow or
dismiss this task.
Legal obligation A legal agent could Jorn the
negotiation about the task and
should enforce any obligation and
clarify the reason behind this
obligation to get the support of
other parties.
Vital Interests As in the legal obligation it should
be clear that the need of the
collaboration task is a matter of life
and death
Public functions Same as in the legal obligation
Table 2 DPA principle 1's conditions agamstTCP/CTRP components.
5.3.2 Principle 2:
Personal data shall be obtained onlYfor one or more specified and lawful purposes, and
shall not be further processed in a'!Y manner incompatible with that purpose or those
purposes.
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By restricting the use of data by a specific task so that it can be used only for
one purpose, so we can ensure that the data will not be used for more than
one purpose.
5.3.3 Principle 3:
Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 10 tbe purpose or
purposes for which they areprocessed.
The collaboration task will not be created unless the data subject and the
referee (if any) make sure that this task will definitely need the required data.
5.3.4 Principle 4:
Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.
Since the data subject himself is involved in the team that creates the
collaboration task, so the personal data can easily be verified and updated.
5.3.5 Principle 5:
Personal data processedfor a'!Ypurpose orpurposes shall not be kept for longer than is
necessaryfor that purpose or thosepurposes.
In the CTCP protocol the start and the end date and time of a task should
be explicitly specified and included in the task-policy. The CTRP protocol
will ensure that all the task's activities will be processed within the specified
time.
5.3.6 Principle 6:
Personal data shall beprocessed in accordancewith the rights oj data sul?jectsunder this
Act.
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In our model we consider a data subject (patient in EHR) to act as the only
owner for his/her personal information and he/she will never lose his
ownership.
5.3.7 Principle 7:
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or
unlauful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruaion of, or
damage to, personal data.
The task should be protected by law and by the available security
mechanisms. In the CTCP firstly, at the introduction level there should be a
proposal for the protection mechanisms/measures (including technical and
legal aspects such as cryptography applications and prosecution) that can be
used to protect a specific task that is going to use the patient information. If
for any reason this proposal does not meet the security requirements then
the task should be dismissed. At the negotiation level such mechanisms will be
verified and tested and the task discarded if these mechanisms fail the test.
All these mechanisms, after it has been found that they can do the job, will
be encapsulated in the created task. The functionality of these mechanisms
will be later described in the CTRP protocol while the task in process.
5.3.8 Principle 8:
Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European
Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level ofprotection for
the rights and freedoms of data su~jects in relation to the processing ofpersonal data.
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Data transfer task is a collaboration task that can be created using the
CTCP / CTRP model. Data transfer will be allowed only among the
collaborators who agreed in the CTCP protocol to adhere to each other's
policies, which can include the protection for the rights and freedoms of
data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data. The personal
data will not only be protected against transfer abroad, it will also not be
possible to transfer the data outside the task.
5.4. Caldicott Principles and Recommendations
In 1997-98 a committee chaired by Professor Caldicott at Cambridge
developed security principles for the medical area [20]. The principles
developed are an expansion and refinement of those found in the Data
Protection Act. The emphasis is on control over the use of patient-
identifiable information and the restriction of access to those who need to
know information for particular purposes.
5.4.1 Principle 1
Justify the purpose( s)
Every proposed use or transfer of person-identifiable information within or from an
organisation should be clearlY defined and scrutinised, with continuing uses regularlY
reviewed,by an appropriateguardian.
This principle is right at the heart of our CTCP /CTRP model. In the CTCP
protocol only one task will be created for each purpose. Later the extent to
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which the task adheres to the original purpose will be fairly tested and
verified through the CTRP protocol.
5.4.2 Principle 2
- Don't useperson-identifiable information unless it is absolutelYnecessary
Person-identifiable information items should not be included unless it is essentialfor tbe
specifiedpupose(s) of that flow. The needfor patients to be identified should be considered
at each stage of satisfying thepupose(s).
This principle can be easily achieved at the early stages in the CTCP
protocol (introduction), where a good reason must be given to create a task. If
for any reason the task does not need to use personal information, this task
will simply be discarded either at the introduction or the negotiation stage.
5.4.3 Principle 3
- Use the minimum necessaryperson-identifiable information
Where use ofperson-identifiable information is consideredto be essential, the inclusion of
each individual item of information should be considered and justified so that the
minimum amount of identifiable information is transferred or accessibleas is necessaryfor
a givenfunction to be earned out.
It is quite similar to the above principle (no. 2). In addition if it is found, in
the process of the CTRP protocol (task assessment stage), that the task is
using unnecessary information then the CTRP will be either aborted or
updated.
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5.4.4 Principle 4
- Access to person-identifiable information should be on a strict need-to-know basis
OnlY those individuals who need access to person-identifiable information should haw
access to it, and they should onlY have access to the information items tbat tbey need 10 see.
This mcry mean introducing access controls or splitting information flows wbm one
information flow is used for several purposes.
In our model the use of any material (person-identifiable information in this
case) will be only through the task-participants. They are the only people
authorised to use the information necessary to perform the defined task.
The task will be for only one purpose. Our model deals with both aspects of
need-to-know. Need-to-know defined in Section 1.5.2. In the CTCP
protocol a collaborator can claim access to information/services, which is
subject to a negotiation. In the CTRP protocol need-to-know is the basis of
the access control by limiting access by the purpose of the task.
5.4.5 Principle 5
- Everyone with access to person-identifiable information should be aware of their
responsibilities
Action should be taken to ensure that those handling person-identifiable information -
both clinical and non-clinical staff - are made fullY aware of their responsibilities and
obligations 10 respect confidentiali(y.
One of the main principles of our model is to clearly define the
responsibility of all the task-participants before creating a task.
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Responsibility is declared at the negotiation stage in the CTCP protocol and
evaluated at the task process assessment at the CTRP protocol
5.4.6 Principle 6
- Understand and complYwith the law
Every use of person-identifiable information must be laufuL Someone in each organisation
handling confidential information should be responsiblefor ensuring that the organisation
complies with legal requirements.
This someone could participate at the agreement stage in the CTCP to prove
or deny the tasks in which the use of the person-identifiable information
appeared to be illegal. In addition at the stage of task process assessment in
the CTRP this someone could monitor the task run and terminate it or update
it if it is found to not comply with the task policy (either automatically or
manually).
5.5. Coverage of Data Protection Act and Caldicott Principles
The correspondence between the DPA and Caldicott principles is shown in
Table 3.
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DPA
Principle 1 Caldicott
-,
Principle 2 ... Principle 1
Principle 3 Principle 2
··············;.·:.:.::.:~········••••.•••II
Principle 4 Principle 3
Principle 5 .. Principle 4
~
Principle 5Principle 6
Principle 7 Principle 6...
Principle 8
Table 3 Correspondence of DPA and Caldicott Principles
Not all the DPA principles, for instance 4,5,6 and 8, are covered by
Caldicott. Principle 4, accuracy and timeliness of data, is assumed in
medical data. Principle 5, length of time data is kept, does not apply to
medical data as normally such data is kept while the patient is alive and
longer if it can be used for tracing medical history for the community or a
family. Principle 6, rights of data subjects, is within the context of the DPA
only. Principle 8, transfer of personal data abroad, is not covered by
Caldicott because the data is considered to be anonymous anyway. Overall,
the main concern in Caldicott is with protecting the assignment of data to
specific persons. The BMA model [10, 11] corresponds more closely to
DPA than Caldicott.
From the other perspective, the Caldicott principles 2 and 4- are not
reflected in the DPA. Both these are task based illustrating the need-to-
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know approach in Caldicott in contrast to the patient consent approach of
DPA and BMA.
The thick lines connecting one principle to another indicate an explicit
correspondence such as the justification for obtaining personal data in
principle 2 of the DPA and principle 1 of Caldicott. The thin lines indicate
an implicit correspondence such as fair and lawful use of data in principle 1
of DPA and principle 6 of Caldicott requiring an understanding and
compliance with the law by the people using the data.
5.6. Review of Satisfaction of Principles by CTCP/CTRP
Model
To conclude a review 1S made to show the extent to which the
CTCP jCTRP model covers the principles of DPA and Caldicott. The
purpose of this review is to show succinctly firstly whether each principle is
covered and secondly the extent to which the requirements of software
engineering [79] are met by the CTCP jCTRP constructions. Ideally there
should be a tick at least once for each principle for coverage, a clearly-
defined single functionality for each protocol for maximal cohesion, an
encapsulation of the protocols for loose coupling and an efficient execution
of the protocols for low energy performance.
Table 4 shows the correspondence between DPA principles and
CTCP jCTRP, using the abbreviation shown in Table 5 components. The
ticks are shown only when the principle is explicitly covered by the
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component at the intension leveL Ticks are not shown where the activity
might arise for a particular case or instance at the extension level but such
activity is not compulsory at the rule-based or intension level. For instance
agreement (Agr) is implicit in most components but is explicit in number 8
where personal data is transferred to another country. The decision protocol
(Dec) is also implicit in many components but is explicit only in principle 2
where it is required that the data will be used only for a specific task. The
component for preparation (pre) is implicitly involved in CTRP but is not
explicitly highlighted in the table as we deal with general principles. Similarly
the component update (Upd) in CTRP is also a \"ery general principle
dependent only on a case and used in emergency. The component for
creating the CTRP protocol (Cre) appears to be excessively employed.
However it is a task performing a critical linking task between CTCP and
CTRP.
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CTCP CfR.P
Principle
Int Neg Dec Agr Cre Pre Pro Ass Log Lpd Dis End
1 ttl ttl
2 ttl ttl ttl ttl ttl
3 ttl
4 ttl
5 ttl
6 ttl ttl ttl ttl
7 ttl ttl ttl
8 ttl ttl ttl ttl ttl ttl
Table 4: Correspondence ofDPA Principles and CTCPjCTRP
Components
Collaboration Task Creation Protocol Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol
Int for Introduction Pre: Preparation
Neg for Negotiation Pro: Task Processing
Dec for Decision Ass: Task process assessment
Agr for Agreement Log: Process log
Cre for Create collaboration task Upd: Task update
Dis: Task process discard
End: Task termination.
Table 5: Abbreviations for protocols components
Table 6 shows the correspondence between Caldicott principles and
CTCPjCTRP components. The pattern is different from that for the DPA
as Caldicott is in general more task-based meaning that there is much more
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explicit mention in the principles of the components we have created in
CTCP /CTRP. For instance in Caldicott, principle 1 (justify the purpose)
requires explicidy all the components of CTCP /CTRP. Principle 4 (need-to-
know restriction on person-identifiable data) is tackled on a task-based
approach using agreement (Agr), creation of CTRP (Cre) and process
logging (Log). The DPA is task-based in principle 2 (data for specified and
lawful purpose) corresponding to principle 1 in Caldicott as in Table 3
above. The pattern is similar in Table 4 and Table 6 for these principles
except that the Caldicott principle is wider in scope and involves more
activity.
CTCP CTRP
Principle
lnt Neg Dec Agr Cre Pre Pro Ass Log L'pd Dis End
1 ., ., ., ., ., ., ., .,
2 .,
3 ., v ., ., ., .,
4 ., ., ., .,
5 ., ., ., .,
6 ., ., ., .,
Table 6: Correspondence of Caldicott Principles and CTCP /CTRP Components.
Table 4 and Table 6 show that all the principles of DPA and Caldicott are
covered by CTCP /CTRP. Every principle is cross-checked positively with
one or more components in the model. CTCP and CTRP also exhibit
maximal cohesion as the activities performed by these protocols are clearly
differentiated. Thus CTCP creates the task including negotiation and
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agreement and CTRP runs the task assisted against the agreed policy. There
is loose coupling between CTCP and CTRP. CTRP is encapsulated: it can
only be called after CTCP has successfully concluded. CTRP can be aborted
resulting in a new CTCP session being started but this is simply a normal
return mechanism. The high-level rule-based nature of CTCP /CTRP
ensures an economical performance. Thus the model meets the software
engineering requirements given earlier.
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5.7. Conclusion
The CTCP /CTRP model appears to meet the general reqwrements of
security for health informatics as outlined by Caldicott and the DPA. In
terms of coverage a match is made with both the more specific task-based
approach of Caldicott and the more general DPA. An analysis of the usage
of the components of CTCP /CTRP against the principles of Caldicott and
DPA shows that, while coverage is achieved in both cases, a more natural
match is made with Caldicott than with DPA because Caldicott is at a more
specific level in dealing with the patient record than DPA. The software
engineering principles of maximal cohesion, low coupling and efficient
execution are met by CTCP /CTRP. From a computing science perspective,
CTCP /CTRP appears to be an appropriate way forward for handling
security principles as developed in Caldicott and DPA. The next stage is to
develop a case study using real case requirements in health care to test the
whole approach.
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Chapter 6
CASE STUDY
6.1. Introduction
In Chapter 5 we have demonstrated a validation for our model against
general security requirements (security regulations). Two security regulations
were used: the Data Protection Act (DP A) and the Caldicott principles. These
were carefully chosen to cover examples of top-level security regulation and
medical related regulation respectively. The validation shows that the model is
capable of meeting this level of requirements. However to build a solid
ground for the idea of the model and its two protocols we thought a real
world case study was essential. The case study attempts to validate the model
against a real-world scenario, where exceptions may arise, and to show to
what extent these exceptions can be handled.
Itwas not an easy task to find a suitable case study. Firsdy we had to identify
a challenging multi-agency services application. Two multi-agency applications
were considered, the Electronic Health Record (EHR) and the Dynamic
Coalition Environment (DCE). These two applications involve information
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sharing among parties, who differ in polices, functions and interest and
currendy both are very active research areas. Secondly and more challenging,
we had to look for a real world scenario among the selected applications
(EHR and DCE) to cover all the parts of the model. For a DCE case study
we constructed a scenario after a literature review for selected DCE projects.
For the EHR case study we took advantage from being involved in
collaboration with a number of projects at University of Newcasde, among
them one run by the Sowerby Centre for Health Informatics at Newcastle
(SCHIN)*. SCHIN is involved in the Durham and Darlington electronic
health record project, for which we were provided with a scenario argued to
be the ideal situation for handling an emergency case.
The following sections firstly discuss the environment of each case study
followed by a mapping of the scenario events with the CTCP and CTRP
protocols' components.
We attempt in the work discussed in this chapter to show how the multi-
agency real world situations can naturally be reflected in our model. This
chapter will cover the two case studies. The first will be an example reflecting
a dynamic coalition situation and the second will be in the Electronic Health
Record (EHR), an emergency scenario from County Durham and Darlington
EHR project .
• Sowerby Centre for Health Informatics at Newcasde (SCHIN) is a research
centre whose aim is to cover all areas of health informatics. The centre was
founded in January 1993 and is academically based in the School of Health
Sciences at Newcasde University, UK.
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6.2. Dynamic Coalition Environment
Dynamic Coalition Environment (DCE) is a special case of the multi-agency
environment and collaboration networks. As the Coalition forms quickly and
dynamically the following problems will be more challenging than in the other
collaboration networks [64]:
• Sharing information involves security risk.
• Partners in one crisis are adversaries in others.
• In addition to security and sharing information the Dynamic
Coalitions problem include Issues such as interoperabiliry,
extensibility and scalability.
A dynamic collation is formed in response to events such as humanitarian
relief (e.g. refugee camps), natural disaster (e.g. earthquake and floods),
international incidents (e.g. terrorist), war (Gulf war and Yugoslavia) and
combat other than war (e.g. Bosnia).
A dynamic coalition may involve:
1. Civilian organisations such as agencIes, embassies, bureaus,
(government organisations), Local Fire and Police Departments,
Doctors without Borders, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Press Crops and Red Cross (none-government organisations).
2. Military organizations such as Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and
Coast Guard.
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6.2.1 Other Approaches:
The Dynamic Coalition problem is considered an active research area and
there are a number of projects world-wide dealing with it. The following are
selected approaches:
• A paper by Phillips, Ting and Demurjian [64] attempts to define the
Dynamic Coalition and explores the challenging issue of sharing
information in such situations. The authors of this paper draw
attention to the lack of management in the current control systems
using the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) as an
example. GCCS is an U.S system on its own private network which
needs to address several security issues to be acceptable for the
Dynamic Coalition environment. In this paper they argue that the
RBAC could be an approach to tackle the access control problem in
these situations and DAC and MAC are both applicable. Aspects
such as syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are considered as a core
part of the problem.
Advantages and disadvantages of DAC, ~L\C and RBAC are
discussed in Chapter 1.
• Yalta [19] is one of a number of projects funded by DARPA to
address the Dynamic Coalition problems. Yalta argued that the
provision of secure collaboration space for dynamic coalition is
based on four ideas:
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1. Create a secure collaboration space from shared space
developed in distributed computing community.
2. Build a Certificate Authority Service based on threshold
cryptography.
3. Implement a Certificate Revocation Notification (Cfu"'\j
4. Support use of the collaboration space as a coordination
channel.
The Yalta project aims to provide an infrastructure for sharing
information among collaborators.
• The Distributed Role-Based Access Control dRBAC [36] is an
access control mechanism for systems that involve multi-
administrative domains. Briefly it is a combination of role-
based access control and trusted management systems, using
cryptographic applications such as: public-key and
cryptographic signature.
6.2.2 Dynamic Coalition in the view of the CTCP/CTRP model
From a task-based perspective we define the Dynamic Coalition as a task to
be carried out by a number of organisations with the aim of responding to
certain events. A number of more specialised sub-tasks are inherited from the
top-level task. Security policy of the inherited sub-tasks will include the parent
security policy.
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Table 7 and Table 8 illustrate a summary of CTCP protocols inputs for a
simple coalition scenario. Table 7 summarise the inputs of top-level task and
Table 8 summarises a sub-task input. There are two collaborators (Coalition
Partners), partner_A is an organisation administrating the humanitarian relief
in a refugee camp and partner_B is an organisation helping with food and
medicines supply.
Coalition Task to provide Humanitarian relief in a refugee camp
Top-level task
Partner_A Partner_B
Requirements Supply of food and Information about the
medicines. refugees (including medical
data)
Resources Information Equipments, drugs and food.
Policies Confidentiality and Availability and accuracy of
pnvacy information.
Table 7 summary of CTCP protocols inputs for simple coalition scenario
(top level task)
1. Creating coalition tasks with the CTCP protocol
a. Introduction:
1. Partner_A: seeks partner_B's help to supply food and
medicines (mechanism used: e.g. email).
11. If Partner_B replies negatively go to the end of
CTCP, else go to the negotiation stage.
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b. Negotiation:
1. Partner_B: insists that they may need information
about the refugees.
11. Partner_A: the information is confidential and the
privacy of the refugees is highly respected, for
instance complying with human right declaration such
as Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
general data protection rules such as Data Protection
Act (see Chapter 2).
c. Decision: if Partners accept each other's policies and
requirements go to the agreement stage else end the CTCP.
d. Agreement: the refugees' information will be used for the
purpose of supplying food and medicines and to grant the
information based on the requirements for each sub task and
should not be available outside of any sub task. This task is a
general task and no information will be granted to its
participants.
e. Task creation: it depends on the way the task is going to be
run. However as this task is a general one it appears as a
container for its subtasks.
2. Running the created tasks with CTRP
The run of this task will be achieved by running all the
subtasks.
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Subtask to supply children food
Partner_A Partner_B
Requirements Supply and distribute Access to the refugee
children foods records
Resources Information Children foods
Policies Access only children data; none
..
the ofrmmrruze use
personnel identifiable data;
use only the information
related to the supply and
distribution of children
foods
Table 8: Summary of CTCP protocols inputs for simple
coalition scenario (sub task)
1. Creating a subtask (supply children food):
a. Introduction:
1. Partner_A: orders children food from
Partner_B.
u, Partner_B: needs to have access to the
camp's database
ui. Both agree and go to negotiation.
b. Negotiation:
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1. Partner_B: details the requrred
activities:
1. Count the number of children
grouped by their ages.
2. List the families and the
number of children ill each
family.
3. Count the number of children
with special needs.
4. Distribute foods.
11. Partner_A: agrees as long as the
required quenes will not disclose
confidential information such as
personal identifiable information.
111. Partner_A: requires the names or roles
of those who will do the work.
rv. Partner_B gives the names and/or roles
c. Decision:
i. Both accept each other's policies
d. Agreement:
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L Partner_A: agrees to grant access to the
subtask.
e. Task Creation:
Assuming that Partner_A is using a relational database the
subtask in this case will be encapsulated in the form of an
SQL procedure or package which grants Partner_B's defined
users an access to it.
The manual activities, those not to be
automated, will be placed formally in an
order familiar to those in the work-place.
6.3. DeE case study evolution
Case study feature CTCP/CTRP feature Exceptions
handling
Advertising food and medicine supply. CTCP .Introduction
Access grant CTCP.Negotiation and
CTCP Decision
Information use and product supply. CTCP.agreement.
Information use and product supply CTCP.Taskcreation.
details and control.
Table 9: summary of the mapping between the DCE scenario (task one) and
the components of the CTCP /CTRP protocols.
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Case study feature crcr /CIRP feature Exceptions
handling
Order children food and medicine. crcr .Introduction
Access control. crCP.Negotiation and
crcr Decision
Details of how to access the CTCP.Agreement and
information. CTCP .Taskcreation
Using the information. CTRP.Process and
CTRP.Assessment
Food and medicine supply. CTRP.Process and
CTRP.Assessment
Table 10: summary of the mapping between the DCE scenario (task two)
and the components of the CTCP /CTRP protocols.
The scenario here is very small; hence all the case study features were fully
represented both in task number 1 in Table 9 and task number 2 in Table 10.
In task number 1 not all the model features were used as it is a top-level task
and its run is achieved by executing all its sub tasks. As a result there were no
uses for the CTRP protocol's components.
In task number 2 more model components were used, although components
such as CTRP.update and CTRP.abort still have not been used as we have not
assumed any exception in this example
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6.4. County Durham and Darlington ERR Project
6.4.1 Preview
A Durham and Darlington electronic health record (now known as the
Integrated Health Care Recorders) has been funded by the NHS information
authority as a part of electronically record development and implementation
programme.
As a part of this work a multi-media animator [27] has been developed. This
animator is based on a real world scenario. The purpose of the animator is to
raise issues and promote discussion about what electronic health care records
could look like, and how they could be used. This version of the animator is
being evaluated within the project focus groups involving the healthcare
professional.
The idea of electronic health records was introduced by the government in
the document Information for Health in 1998. It outlines the intentions to invest
in technology, and bring the NHS to the 2151 century. One of the targets is to
introduce electronic health care records by 2005.
"An Electro Health Records is used to describe the concept of a longitudinal record of
patient's health and bealtbcarefrom cradletograve"
(EHR) has been described as a cradle to grave record, which would provide a
framework for NHS professionals in different parts of the house service to
act together to deliver better quality and better coordinated care
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A particular focus of the Durham and Darlington electronic health records
project has been to understand the potential problems as well as the benefits
of an electronic health record system. Ibis includes a technical requirements
as well as the potential impact on current work practices.
For example there are many issues surrounding sharing of confidential
information across barriers of NHS healthcare organisations. Ibis
presentation is based on an emergency case scenario. It is intended to
provoke debate and raise discussion to help in a development of an EHR
which can successfully meet our needs.
In the space of a few years, Durham, Darlington, and Tees have become
single strategic health authority and 10 primary care trusts are in full
operation. There are three care trusts supported by ambulance trusts and
mental health trust teams operating within the communitv. Patients have
begun to understand the idea of managed care pathways and to expect
different parts of the health service to coordinate their activities and the care
that they deliver. It is important to note that the text of this case study is a
transcript from a multimedia animator; accordingly the language is informal to
some extent.
6.4.2 The story (an emergency incident Scenario)
The story of the EHR scenario concerns Mr Jones a 58-year old ex-miner
who was diagnosed as a non-insurance dependent diabetic in 1996. Mr Jones
has been experiencing chest pains and has been diagnosed as suffering from
coronary heart disease. He has been introduced to the coronary heart disease
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national service informed by his GP and as we can see he has an electronic
health record.
We begin our story at the point where :\1r Jones experiences a severe chest
pain after going to bed. He calls NHS Direct.
NHS Direct: NHS Direct, I am Kathleen, how can I help you?
Mr Jones: I have got a terrible pain in my chest
NHS Direct: Can you tell me your name please-
Mr Jones: My name is Edward Jones
NHS Direct: and where are you :\Ir Jones?
Mr Jones: I'm at home
NHS Direct: can you tell me your address?
Mr Jones: 23 High Streets in Esinglee.
NHS Direct: 23 High Street in Esinglee, is that right?
Mr Jones: That is right.
NHS Direct: Have you called us before :\Ir Jones?
Mr Jones: No, this is the first time, this pain is appallingly bad.
NHS Direct: Could yOUdescribe it to me Mr Jones?
Mr Jones: It is like my chest is in a vice, like a big weight on me.
NHS Direct: Have you had the pain ,-ery long?
Mr Jones: About 20 minutes, but it was not quite as bad at first.
NHS Direct: I think I need to call an ambulance :\1r Jones, and get you in a
hospital right away. Is there anyone with you?
Mr Jones: No, I'm on my own.
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NHS Direct: OK, Mr Jones, I have called out an ambulance for you, and I
can see that you have got an electronic health record.
At this point we will look in detail at how the NHS Direct patient-adviser
accesses Mr J ones' electronic health record from within the :NHS Direct
Clinical assessment system.
When the patient-adviser selects the EHR button the card system send the
basic information about Mr Jones to the EHR.
The EHR responds quickly with a list of three close matches -- all named
Jones and two of them named Edward. The patient-adviser selects the first
patient in the list as it matches Mr Jones' address and confirms the date of
birth with him to ensure the correct record is selected. She is now presented
with an emergency record for Mr Jones from the EHR. This contains clinical
information such as current medical problems and medication he is taking. It
also contains information about Mr Jones' domestic circumstances that the
ambulance staff can use to ensure that the emergency is handled quickly and
efficiently.
NHS Direct:: OK Mr Jones I have sent some details to the ambulance men
and notified the hospital. They will be expecting you.
Mr Jones: Oh, thank you.
NHS Direct: Have you tried to use an aspirin?
Mr Jones: That was the first thing, I did but it does not seem be working this
time.
NHS Direct: I can see from your record that your neighbour at number 25
has a key to your house; will they be in?
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Mr Jones: Oh yes, Edith, she is always in at this time. Will it be long?
NHS Direct They should be with you shortly. I'm looking at the screen and
they're only a few minutes away. Shall I tell your daughter Janice that you
have been taken to the hospital?
Mr Jones: Oh, I don't want to get her all worried about me.
NHS Direct: Oh, don't worry Mr Jones we are really careful about this sort
of thing. But someone needs to know that you have been taken to hospital
especially as you are living on your own.
Mr Jones: Oh, right, then she is a good lass, but she does worry ... Oh the
ambulance has maybe arrived.
NHS Direct: I hope you get well soon Mr Jones I will call off now.
The information sent to the ambulance is quite specific. It includes
demographics, the fact that Mr Jones is a diabetic and his current medication.
It also contains the message, that Mr Jones' neighbour at number 25 has a key
to his house.
Any interventions in an ambulance such as giving aspirin and taking blood
pressure and NCG are all recorded on board the ambulance using supplied
equipment. When the ambulance arrives at accident and emergency, this
information together with the confirmation of the patient identity is
transmitted automatically to the hospital system. The ambulance system has
also printed out a paper version of this information with a receipt form which
is signed by the receiving nurse.
Meanwhile before the ambulance has arrived, the accident and emergency
team assistant has received a notification of the incident by accessing the
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electronic health record system. She is able to assemble any notes from the
information that Dr Alperton, the GP and Mr Jones himself placed in the
EHR.
In particular she discovers that Mr Jones attended a cardiology outpatient
clinic at hospital some six week earlier. The relative ECG results give clinical
information on treatment from the hospital electronic patient record system.
So, on arrival at accident and emergency and with confirmation of Mr Jones'
identity the staff were able to print out care pathway forms, which already
have been furnished with initial EHR data and a set of labels for Mr Jones'
samples.
This scenario raises a number of questions particularly about how and when
(EHR) information is produced in the first place and how it would be
maintained.
So let us go back a few months, before the events we have just been looking
at and see how the information got there. Mr Jones had presented himself at
the surgery complaining of chest pain.
As part of the recommended care pathway Mr Jones was booked in for an
exercise ECG at the hospital. As a result of this Mr Jones was diagnosed as
suffering from coronary heart disease and was placed on an appropriate
register within his primary care trust. In a consultation with his doctor, the use
of the electronic health record was explained to him.
Doctor: now Mr Jones, we have seen from the results from the hospital, that
the pain you have been having is Angina, and that you have coronary heart
disease. Lots of men in your age and a lot younger have this, and if we are
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careful we can manage it very well You'll have a session with your nurse to
talk about your data exercise, and then I want to talk to you about what we
can do to make sure you get the right treatment if there is an emergency.
Mr Jones: Oh, do you think I am going to have a heart attack?
Doctor: Not necessarily, but it is a possibility, and if you get the right
treatment quickly, then you could make a complete recovery, and that is what
I want to discuss with you. If we put the important information from your
record here at the surgery into a system called the electronic health record,
then this information can be shared with other health care professionals based
in the UK.
Mr Jones: Who would that be doctor?
Doctor: Well, the information you have given us here could be important for
doctors in the hospital. If you want to call NHS Direct or the ambulance
service for example, they can find out all the things they need to know about
your heart condition and diabetes, and that will help them give you the right
treatment.
Mr Jones: That sounds grand doctor, but would it mean that the ambulance
men and nurses can see everything about me?
Doctor: Well, look here at my screen. If I press this button we can look at the
sort of EHR information we need to give to emergency staff. This is what the
ambulance service would see. It includes things like your current condition,
medication, and allergy.
Mr Jones: Oh, that is OK, I would have expected you to know that anyway.
Doctor: Is there some thing concerning you, Mr Jones?
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Mr Jones: Well, it is going back a bit, but you remember when you first came
to the valley lots of years ago. I had a spot of bother with my neighbours.
Doctor: Don't worry about that Mr J ones, the only things that will go in the
EHR for that long ago is the record of major surgery and things that have
long term importance to your health.
Mr Jones: That is good, doctor.
Doctor: As well as medical information there is a space for you to put things
in your EHR like your next of kin and any preferences for treatment.
Mr Jones: I do not know how to use one of those things.
Doctor: Do not worry, what I will do is book you a session with Judith, the
Trust Health Record Counsellor and she will take you through all the things
and help you. Is that OK?
Mr Jones: Thank you doctor. It all looks a bit complicated.
Doctor: Do not worry Edward, Judith will be able to sort everything out with
you. Now that is all, let me show you out.
6.4.3 The scenario in the sight of the CTCP/CTRP model
In the above scenario there are two tasks. The first task (Emergency Incident
Task) involves two collaborators, Mr Jones (patient) and Kathleen (NHS-
Direct adviser) and a summary of the CTCP protocol inputs are shown in
Table 11. The second task which is summarised in Table 12 involves two
collaborators Mr Jones (patient) and Dr. Alperton (Mr Jones' GP).
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Emergency Incident Task
Patient (Mr Jones) NHS-direct (Kathleen)
Requirements To be treated for chest pain Information:
Name, address, some details
about the incident and name
of anybody that can help him
and to be informed about his
case.
Resources Information (including Medical Care Services
EHRrecord)
Policies Not to inform his daughter. Grant access to part of Mr
Jones' EHR record to other
units such as: ambulance
crew, medical staff at the
paramedic unit and to
primary care (GP)
Table 11: Summary of the Emergency incident Task inputs
Task Creation Protocol CTCP:
Collaborators: 1. Mr Jones (patient)
2. Kathleen (NHS-Direct Adviser)
Introduction:
Mr. Jones calls the NHS-direct complaining from pain in his chest.
The NHS-direct make sure that it is a sort of pain needing an
emergency task.
Negotiation:
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Kathleen: required the following information:
L Full name and address.
11. Whether anyone is there with Mr Jones at home.
111. A bit more detail on how bad is the pain.
IV. Has the patient called before?
v. Whether to inform your daughter Janice (next of kin)
about your case.
MrJones
1. Full name Edward Jones, address: 23lligh Street
11. Living alone.
111. The pain lasted for about 20 minutes.
IV. No it's first time.
V. No, do not inform her, I would not worry her.
vi. His house's keys left with his neighbour Mrs Edith
Smith. (?? No qiv)
Decision:
Kathleen: will send the Ambulance.
Agreement:
Kathleen: agreed not to inform Mr Jones' daughter.
Mr Jones: Agreed information about him will be propagated to the
health care units dealing with his incident (ambulance crew,
paramedic medical staff and his GP).
Task creation:
This task is composed of three groups of activates as following:
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Kathleen (NDA):
1. Fetch the EHR record of Mr Jones.
11. Forward information to the ambulance medical crew
and to the paramedic unit (through the hospital
system).
Ambulance Medical Crew (names in this role):
1. Receive the information and use it to reach 0.Ir Jones'
address and to give him the medicine that he needs to
take on his way to the hospital (aspirin and blood
pressure test).
11. Pick up Mr Jones.
ill. Give him some medicine.
IV. Print a receipt including information about Mr Jones
identity and information about medicine he took on his
way to the hospital.
v. The receipt will be handed to the paramedic staff at the
hospital and an electronic copy will be transmitted to
the hospital system.
Paramedic Medical staff (names in this role):
1. Access the EHR record of Mr Jones.
11. Discover previous visit to the coronary care unit.
ill. Diagnose (e.g. ECG)
IV. Store results in the hospital system.
Y. Send results to Mr Jones' GP.
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Running Task 1 using the CTRP protocol;
The following entities (in this task are all human) are the task participants:
Kathleen: NHS-direct Adviser role, Janet (nurse) and Kim (Driver):
Ambulance Crew role, Dr. Smith (ECG Doctor) and Lora (paramedic
Nurse): Paramedic Medical Staff role, and Mr. Jones (the patient).
Preparation:
Call the Ambulance and inform the paramedic unit at the hospital.
Task process and assessment:
Activity No 1:
Process: Kathleen fetches the EHR record of MrJones.
Assessment: Is she authorised?
Activity No 2:
Process: K.athleen: forwards information to the ambulance medical crew
and to the paramedic unit.
Assessment:: Was it really sent to the ambulance medical crew
and to the paramedic unit. One possible implementation by
receiving authenticated acknowledgments from both the
ambulance medical crew and to the paramedic unit.
Activity No 3:
Process: Kim receives name and address of Mr. Jones'.
Assessment: none.
Process: Kim picks up Mr. Jones.
Assessment: Picked up the right person?
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Did she find the right person at the right place?
Process: Janet gives Mr. Jones the medicine that he needs to take on his
way to the hospital.
Assessment: Check whether the medicine was subscribed before.
Process: the ambulance arrived at the hospital (A & E). Janet prints a
dispatch receipt including the start and the arrival time of the
ambulance and any medicine given to Mr. Jones during the
journey. Janet signs it and give it to Lora with Mr. Jones.
Assessment: Lora checks the information against the information
received electronically from the NHS Direct.
The above is just an example on how the task can be run. It should be noted
that some policies used to assist the task activities were not in the task
policies. In fact a task can inherit any general policy or ethical code.
Exception handling:
Firsdy before handling an exception a system needs to capture it. Any strange
behaviour is considered as a task policy violation and the exception is
captured in the CTRP protocol as a policy violation.
In our model exceptions are divided into three types according to the
handling process:
1. Exceptions with which the task can still continue to its normal end.
Exceptions of this type are handled within the CTRP protocol by the
task update component. Case 2, in the following examples, is an
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example of this type of exception. Figure 19 illustrates the CfRP
protocol and shows the path of the exception type as a double line.
Z. Exceptions with which the task must be terminated and another task is
required to complete the planned function.
Such cases are handled partially in the CTRP protocol. The task in such
cases is aborted and the process log (task history) used by the CTCP
protocol to create another task to redo the function that could not be
done by the terminated task with consideration for the exceptions that
have arisen. The exception-handling path for this type is shown as a
thick line in Figure 19.
3. Exceptions with which the task must be terminated and there is no
need for any further actions.
There are cases where the task is immediately terminated and no
further actions are possible. Exceptions from this type are handled
within the CTRP protocol through the ABORT component. Case 3 is
an example. The exception-handling path for this type is shown as a
dotted line in Figure 19.
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Update
!nit Process
Figure 19 Petri net graph shows the exception handling types in
the CTRP protocol.
As the scenario was for an ideal situation no exception or error occurred.
However in the real world, exceptions do happen and systems need to be
prepared. For further details about exception handling in our model see
Chapter 4. To demonstrate the exception handling in our model we will use
some exceptions proposed by Professor Mike Martin3 in a discussion about
the possible exceptions in such scenario.
Case 1: multiple ambulances:
This could happen if for instance Mr Jones' daughter found her father
unconscious and called for an ambulance even though he has already arranged
3 Professor Mike Martin is the technical director for the County Durham &
Darlington EHR project
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for one through the NHS Direct and the ambulance is already on its way to
Mr. Jones' address.
Ibis exception can be captured at the introduction of the Cf'Cl? protocol as it
will appear as a duplicate task for NHS Direct. To handle this exception the
new task will be discarded.
Case 2: ambulance breakdown
On its way to the hospital the ambulance has a breakdown due to a
mechanical/ electrical fault.
Ibis exception will be reported by the ambulance crew to the task generator -
_ NHS Direct. Ibis reflects the situation that the process of the task
experiences a problem. The CTRP will prompt to be able to allow insertion of
activities to resume the task. In this case the new activity is to send another
ambulance.
Case 3: Mr. Jones found dead in his house:
Mr. Jones breathes his last before the ambulance arrived.
The CTRP protocol, while processing and assessing the actrvmes of the
emergency task particularly the activity of picking up Mr. Jones. The CTRP
protocol will prompt that it is not possible to take Mr. Jones to the hospital.
In this case no further activities can be followed in this task, which will cause
the task to be aborted and no further action needs to be done.
Task 2: Mr Jones' visit to his GP
Ibis task in fact happened before task number 1 and some data that had been
used by task number 1 was created by this task.
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There was another task before this task, which is Mr Jones' visit to the
hospital, where he was diagnosed as suffering from coronary heart disease.
Emergency incident Task
Patient (Mr Jones) GP (Dr Alperton)
Requirements Further follow up Information, consent to use
for his case. the stored information about
him and to make them
available for other medical
staff
Resources Information Medical care services
(including EHR
record)
Policies To restrict the use of Grant access to part of Xlr
the information by Jones' EHR record to other
doctors, NHS Direct medical staff
and emergency staff
Table 12: Task 2 (the GP visit) inputs summary
Introduction:
According to the hospital report you have angina.
Negotiation
GP:
Information related to this case is stored in the EHR. This data will be
shared with other health care staff.
Mr. Jones:
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Who?
GP:
Doctors at hospital, NHS Direct and emergency staff.
Decision
GP:
The GP will follow the treatment of Mr Jones
Agreement:
MrJones:
Agrees his medical record will be available to any medical
staff dealing with his treatment.
Task Creation:
The following are the activities of this task:
EHR training tutorial for Mr Jones.
Arrangement for regular visits for Mr Jones to GP.
EHR case study evolution
Case study feature CTCP/CTRP Exceptions handling
feature
Call the NHS-direct CTCP.Introduction
Call the NHS-direct CTCP .Introduction CTCP.Introduction
(duplicate call)
Required information CTCP.N egotiation
Case verification CTCP.Negotiation
Informing relatives CTCP.Negotiation
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Infonning relatives CTCP.Decision
Case identification CTCP.Decision
Patient consent CTCP.N egotiation
CTCP.Agreement
consent accept/reject CTCP.Decision
Responsibility and roles CTCP.TaskCreation
Access the EHR record of CTRP.Process
MrJones CTRP.Assessment
Information forward CTRP.Process
CTRP.Assessment
Ambulance arrangement CTRP.Process
CTRP.Assessment
Pick up Mr Jones (patient CTRP.Process CTRP.abort
dead) CTRP.Assessment
Test and treatment on CTRP.Process
board CTRP.Assessment
Taking Mr. Jones to the CTRP.Process CTRP.update
A&E CTRP.Assessment
(ambulance breakdown)
Arriving at the A&E CTRP.Process
CTRP.Assessment
Test and treatment at the CTRP.Process
A&E CTRP.Assessment
Table 13: Illustration of the mapping between the events of the emergency
scenario and the components of the CTCP /CTRP.
We have included some exceptions that were added to the scenano and
discussed in section 6.4.3. Table 13 shows that:
• All the case study's processes are represented in the model
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• The mapping between the case study's processes and the
model components are readily matched.
• All the model features are used to represent the case study .
The above points respectively demonstrate the coverage, neutralitv and focus
of the model. It is important to notice that the case study (EHR) is
independent of the model development.
Case study feature CTCP / CTRP feature Exceptions
handling
Informing Mr Jones about the CTCP .Introduction
result of his test at the hospital
Consent for Information CTCP.N egotiation
sharing CTCP Decision
Patient training CTCP. TaskCreation
Table 14: Illustration for the mapping between the events of the GP visit
and the components of the CTCP /CTRP.
In task 2 as shown in Table 14 all the case study features are represented,
demonstrating the coverage of the model. However, from the model focus
point of view, not all the model features were used in this task because the
task is very simple and no further actions/processes were required.
6.5. Conclusion
The purpose of the work discussed in this chapter is to challenge the model
with a real case study.
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Two case studies were used The first demonstrates how the protocols
worked in a simple environment for tutorial purpose. The second showed
how the model coped with an example of real-world complexity, exhibiting its
ability to deal with the exceptions that inevitably occur in complex scenarios.
The second case study demonstrates the coverage, neutrality and focus of the
model, that is all the case study's process were represented. The mapping
between the case study's processes and the model components are readily
matched and all the model features are used to represent the case study. This
case study showed that all the exceptions were captured, and safely handled.
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Chapter 7
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
7.1. Thesis summary and discussion
Multi-agency services have proved very difficult to supply. Both technical
and political problems occur. Technical difficulties include the integration
of various networks and databases and political difficulties include policy
conflicts and rapid change in organisations. Security management in such an
environment is a major challenge as dynamic policies and different views
and interests need to be modelled and prioritised. Security management
therefore has both political and technical aspects. This thesis attempts to
alleviate difficulties, which may otherwise discourage the development of
collaboration networks. The area selected for regulations, principles and
case studies was the medical area as it naturally involves multiple agents and
we could take advantage of collaborative links with a medical informatics
group at the Medical School, Newcasde University for obtaining advice and
information.
The approach taken in this thesis has involved a number of stages. The
regulations, declarations, rules and principles have been analysed, discussed
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and classified so as to achieve an understanding of the nature of the security
requirements in this area (Chapter 2). Sources consulted included the
general purpose Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Data
Protection Act for Britain. More specialised regulations, on the application
area of medical multi-agency applications selected for study, included the
World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and the Council of
Europe Recommendation and two British collection of rules, the principles
of BMA and Caldicott. The discussion of these requirements, relationships
between them and the debate that was invoked by the declaration of some
of them helped to identify the fundamental security requirements for an
integrated health care record such as the Health Electronic Record.
Regulations such as the Data Protection Act and the Caldicott principles
explicitly request that the use of any confidential data must be restricted by a
purpose (e.g. DPA's principle 2 and Caldicott's principle 1). In addition
there is no need without purpose leading to the concept of need-to-know,
which can be used to restrict access to confidential data for only specific
purposes.
A study of the existing security models such as the Bell-Lapadula Model
(BLP), the Clark-Wilson model, the Biba model, the Chinese wall model and
the Harrison-Ruzzon-Ullman model (HRU) showed that none of these
models will meet the security requirements in a multi-agency services
environment. This is because they are designed to meet specific security
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policy, for instance the BLP deals with confidentiality in a multi-level
security environment and Biba in the same environment deals with integrity;
in these models, apart from the Chinese wall model, the information flows
vertically (Multi-Level Security Policies), while in a multi-agency service
environment it flows horizontally (Multilateral Security Policies); none of
these models control the use of data.
In addition the examination of the BMA model, the only existing security
model for the health care information systems, demonstrated that this
model fails to meet the multi-agency security requirements as it lacks anv
facilities for handling need-to-know (Chapter 3).
Other conventional approaches and techniques of access control (Chapter
1) such as Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) were also considered.
Although almost all the available operating systems, software and
application are based on these approaches, they were found not up to the
challenge imposed in any attempt to build a secure multi-agency service
environment. For instance they do not have any explicit solution for
problems such as need-to-know, control of the use of data, relationships,
responsibilities and dynamic ownership management.
The task-based approach was carefully selected as an approach for our
model as it is logically more suitable for such an environment. Indeed the
task-based approach supports the control of data access and its usage by
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purpose. The task is a common object between collaborators,
responsibilities are explicitly recognized and the task is scalable dvnarnic, -
and flexible.
There are some existing task-based approaches but examination showed that
none of these models meet the multi-agency requirements. For instance
TBAC only deals with the authorisation, the Fischer-Hubner model deals
only with the privacy aspect and GSM is only suitable for hierarchical
systems. This matter is discussed further later in this chapter.
The solution identified in this work (Chapter 4) for the secunrv
requirements was to develop a task-based model, CTCP jCTRP, comprising
a Collaboration Task Creation Protocol which provides a negotiating
framework for producing CTRP and a Collaboration Task Runtime
Protocol, for monitoring and running the created task. The model handles
exceptions and errors.
The model was tested ill a number of ways. Firstly the model was
represented in Petri net form, a notation suited to a distributed,
asynchronous, concurrent, parallel and non-deterministic environment.
Secondly the model was validated against the regulations, the Data
Protection Act and Caldicott principles, forming the requirements for the
security and against software engineering principles (Chapter 5). Thirdly a
simple example for tutorial and demonstration purposes was developed.
Fourthly two case studies were made (Chapter 6), one on a relatively simple
problem (dynamic coalition), the other on a more realistic problem
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(emergency scenario taken from a real project in health care) independent
from the development of the model. Finally implementation guidelines were
suggested for the protocols' components.
The model satisfied all these tests. The Petri nets produced were validated
by PEP software for consistency including reachability. The model met the
requirements and covered the critical aspects in both the more specific task-
based approach of Caldicott and the more general DPA. The software
engineering principles of maximal cohesion, low coupling and efficient
execution were met by CTCP /CTRP. The simple example was Yer)"helpful
for explaining the protocols at conferences.
The case studies, including a real-world one, were realisable in the model.
The results of this work showed that the protocols can cope with real-world
scenarios. Although the case study was for an ideal situation, in which there
was no error or exceptions, a number of exceptions were suggested by a
person, who is direcdy involved in the projects that resulted in the scenario.
The test showed that the protocols are able to handle these exceptions. The
mapping between the protocols components and the case study processes
demonstrates the property of neutrality in the model. The test also showed
that all the case studies processes were representable, which means that the
property of coverage is achieved. Not all the protocols components were
used in the first case study as it was a simple one. However the focus
property was achieved in the second case study, which is more realistic as all
the protocols components were used.
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7.2. Related works
Existing work addresses one part of the requirements but not the other. The
solutions can be classified as multi-agent but not task-based and task-based
but not multi-agent. These are discussed below.
7.2.1 Solutions for Multi-agency Applications that are not a task-based
Solutions in health care information system in Europe and CS such as the
collaboration environment (WebOnCOLL) [21] and the TIHI (Tmsled
Interoperation of Healthcare Information) project [90] are not capable of addressing
the security requirements in a multi-agency environments as they rely on
traditional access control mechanisms and they cannot effectively support
requirements such as data using control, responsibility tracing and ownership
management (see Section 1.4).
In the UK the only security policy model developed to meet the security
requirements for the health care information systems is the BMA model.
Considering its importance this model was considered in depth in this
research and Chapter 3 covers a detailed study in which the model was
verified and investigated against the multi-agency security requirements. The
result of this investigation showed that the model is not capable of meeting a
number of these requirements (Section 3.5).
Yalta [19] and dRBAC [36] are two from a rather short list of contributions to
the solution of the security problem in another multi-agency services
application, the Dynamic Coalition. Yalta is one of a number of projects
funded by DARPA which aims to provide an infrastructure for sharing
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information among collaborators. The Distributed Role-Based Access
Control dRBAC [36] is an access control mechanism for systems that involve
multi-administrative domains. However neither Yalta nor dRBAC explicitly
support requirements such as control data use and ownership managements.
In addition there is no framework in which the collaborator can negotiate.
Section 6.2.1 covers a discussion for a number of Dynamic Coalition projects.
[51] Addresses the negotiation and management of resources in Dynamic
Coalitions and [89] show a mathematical framework that is capable of
expressing negotiation.
However multi-agency security requirements are more than just negotiation
support.
Another related area is the cross-organization security management (Section
1.4.) where the following are examples for different applications: Access
Management Broker server and a plug-in module for web servers [58], the
Digital Library Authentication and Authorisation Architecture (DLA3) and
Coalition for Networked Information (CN!) [54]. None of these support any
framework enables collaborators to negotiate issues such as access privileges
and any authorised access will be limited by the intent or purpose.
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7.2.2 Task-based models but not for multi-agency applications:
The task-based approach as discussed thoughout the thesis (section 1.63.5.3
and 4.1.1) is a promising approach to deal with security reqwrement.
Researchers have studied the task-based approach and tried to use it to
address some security requirements. Mahling, Coury and Croft [55] have
noted the important of this approach and tried to build a task-based
collaboration model. The Steinke model or the Group Security model (GSM)
[80] seeks to provide access to information on the basis of a user's task.
Thomas and Sandhu in 1994 used this approach to address integrity issues in
computerized information systems [81]. In 1997 they used the Task-based
approach to develop their TBAC (Task-based Access Control). This model
aims to address the authorization management problem. Fischer-Hubner and
Ott [34] developed a task-based model to deal with privacy issue.
None of the above task-based models seeks to address the security problem
in the multi-agency environment. For detailed discursion of these models
refer to Section 1.6.
7.3. Limitation and future research
For the model to be general and to be capable of dealing with human-
involved tasks, a 100% implementation (computerization) for the model with
one standard will be a major research topic. Further research will be invited to
divide the different tasks into categories and then create a template for each
Th la th beginning will be acceptable in differentcategory. e temp tes at e b-
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formats as it will be difficult to find one format to fit all task types. Such
research could lead firstly to a standard for writing task templates. This step
will encourage researchers to look for a standard for the CTCP/CTRP model
implementation, which will work in all cases.
More research is needed to formally verify all the components of the
CTCP / CTRP protocols and establish standard interface between these
components. A possible way forward is to use a combination of logical
mathematics (e.g. category theory) and Petri nets which is under development
but is a very substantial topic in its own right [6]. Petri nets are increasingly
accepted as a useful technique for formulating security policies [71]. Category
theory provides a logical framework within which the details of Petri nets can
be embedded.
Previous work by Furuta and Stotts [37], using Petri Net in collaboration
networks, can be built upon. In particular the negotiation and introduction
components in CTRP can adopt the method used by Furuta and Stotts.
In CTRP the Petri nets will be expanded to examine the possibility of dead
lock cases in a parallel activity processing situation.
In this thesis we have introduced the idea of validating models against security
regulation. This can be the basis for more research in this area. For instance it
may be possible to develop languages to convert security regulation into
formal security policies.
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The research reported in this thesis draws attention to the advantages of the
task-based approach and how this approach can be an alternative to the rather
exhausted approaches such as the Role-Based approach. These advantages
will encourage researchers to challenge the task-based approach with other
security requirements. Itmay also be possible to implement operating systems
or standard network protocols based on this idea.
In this thesis the CTCP / CTRP model was tested with two case studies, one
of which was a real-world case study. These two case studies were in two
applications: Dynamic Coalition (an example) and Electronic Health Record
(a real-world scenario). With more time and availability of collaboration we
would like to challenge the model with more real-world scenarios in these two
applications and in other multi-agency scenarios.
In this research we have used three security languages to represent a security
policy model. These languages for the first time were challenged with
independent policies and the results of this works express the need for more
research in the area of security languages.
Workflow systems are used extensively in business to run processes ill a
controlled environment. Workflow systems and our model CTCP /CTRP are
both task-based. Therefore it should be possible to apply the CTCP /CTTRP
model directly to a workflow system. It should be investigated whether
security policies specified through CTCP and implemented through CTRP
can to be applied effectively to a complete workflow system. In particular we
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aim to investigate the possibility of using workflow management systems and
techniques to implement the task process component within the CIRP.
7.4. Conclusion
In this research we contributed to the solution of the multi-agency services
and collaboration networks security problem. We have shown how a study
for the security rules and regulations leads to better understanding for the
security requirements. The study reviewed current declarations, legislation and
regulations to bring together a global, European and national perspective for
security in health services. This study helps to properly identify an appropriate
approach to tackle difficult problem such as multi-agency security problem
and helps to identify security requirement for potential electronic health
record.
We have examined a British security policy model, BMA, using the security
languages and showed that the BMA model is incapable of supporting multi-
agency security requirements such as need-to-know.
We developed a task-based CTCP /CTRP model based on two linked
protocols. The CTCP (Collaboration Task Creation Protocol) is designed to
enable collaborators to negotiate (include decision and agreement) and create
tasks that comply with their policies and meet their requirements. The CTRP
(Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol) is designed to enable the collaborators
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to follow up the execution of their tasks and to ensure that tasks are running
under the agreed poliey and on the right track to meet the potential goal The
models were represented by Petri nets.
The developed model was validated against two regulations the DPA and the
Caldicott principles and reviewed for technical completeness and satisfaction
of software engineering principles.
The model was finally tested against two case studies from two different
applications, one of them is real-world case study. The coverage, neutrality
and focus of the model were examined.
The final outcome of this research is to draw attention to the need of further
research in areas such as security poliey languages, security requirements
investigation and alternative access control approaches.
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Appendix A
PRINCIPLES OF THE DATA PROTECTION ACT (DPA)
Principles verbatim from DPA 1998
1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall
not be processed unless-
(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and
(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in
Schedule 3 is also met.
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with
that purpose or those purposes.
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purpose or purposes for which they are processed.
4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.
5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for
longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.
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6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data
subjects under this Act.
7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental
loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.
8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate
level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to
the processing of personal data.
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Caldicott Principles
Principle 1 - Justify the purpose(s)
Every proposed use or transfer of patient-identifiable information within or
from an organisation should be clearly defined and scrutinised, with
continuing uses regularly reviewed, by an appropriate guardian.
Principle 2 - Don't use patient-identifiable information unless it is
absolutely necessary
Patient-identifiable information items should not be included unless it is
essential for the specified purpose(s) of that flow. The need for patients to be
identified should be considered at each stage of satisfying the purpose(s).
Appendices 3
Appendix B Caldicott Principles and Recommendations
Principle 3 - Use the minimum necessary patient-identifiable
information
Where use of patient-identifiable information is considered to be essential, the
inclusion of each individual item of information should be considered and
justified so that the minimum amount of identifiable information is
transferred or accessible as is necessary for a given function to be carried out.
Principle 4 - Access to patient-identifiable information should be on a
strict need-to-know basis
Only those individuals who need access to patient-identifiable information
should have access to it, and they should only have access to the information
items that they need to see. This may mean introducing access controls or
splitting information flows where one information flow is used for several
purposes.
Principle 5 - Everyone with access to patient-identifiable information
should be aware of their responsibilities
Action should be taken to ensure that those handling patient-identifiable
information - both clinical and non-clinical staff - are made fully aware of
their responsibilities and obligations to respect patient confidentiality.
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Principle 6 - Understand and comply with the law
Every use of patient-identifiable information must be lawful. Someone in
each organisation handling patient information should be responsible for
ensuring that the organisation complies with legal requirements.
Caldicott Recommendations
Recommendation 1:
Every flow of information, current or proposed, should be tested against
these principles as a matter of course. Continuing flows should be re-tested
regularly and routinely.
Recommendation 2:
It is recommended that a programme of work, led by the NHS Executive,
be established to reinforce confidentiality and IM&T security requirements
amongst all staff within the NHS, with senior managers being specifically
targeted to remind them of their responsibilities for maintaining security and
confidentiality within their organisations. This programme should include:
• effective dissemination of existing guidance;
• the establishment of local codes of conduct aimed at safeguarding
patients' rights in this respect;
• appropriate awareness training to ensure that all staff who have
access to patient-identifiable information are fully aware of their
Appendices 5
Appendix B Caldicott Principles and Recommendations
obligations to respect and protect the confidentiality of that
information;
a duty of confidence requirement in staff contracts and induction
processes that ensure newly recruited staff are informed of policies
and procedures as part of standard induction processes;
undertaking work in conjunction with the clinical professions and
patient groups, to produce readily accessible material for patients
which will clearly inform them about the uses to which information
about them may be put, and to establish the most effective ways of
disseminating this information;
• Ensuring that, in all cases where access to patient-identifiable
•
•
information held electronically is necessary, computer systems must
adhere to the requirements set out in the NHS Executive's I~[&T
Security Manual, implement appropriate security controls and
provide audit trails of access to such information.
Recommendation 3:
A senior person should be nominated in each NHS organisation, including
the Department of Health and associated agencies, to act as a "guardian". The
"guardian" should normally be a senior health professional or be closely
supported by such a person. The NHS IM&T Security Manual (Section 18.4)
requires each organisation to designate a senior medical officer to oversee all
procedures affecting access to person-identifiable health data. This role and
that of the "guardian" may be combined, providing there is no conflict of
Appendices 6
Appendix B Caldicott Principles and Recommendations
interest. The Department of Health should take the development of this role
forward in partnership with interested parties.
Recommendation 4:
Guidance must be provided for those individuals/bodies responsible for
approving uses of patient-identifiable information (for example. the
"guardian" or research ethics committees) to enable them to critically appraise
new proposals and continuing practice.
Recommendation 5:
We wish to see the Department and the 1':HS, along with partner
organisations, jointly identify the key areas in which protocols are required
and prepare and publish good practice frameworks for local adoption in these
areas
Recommendation 6:
It is further recommended that consistent with the framework of
responsibility advocated by this report, each NHS and non-1':HS organisation
clearly establishes and communicates to partner organisations who is
responsible for monitoring the sharing and transfer of information within the
agreed local protocol.
Recommendation 7:
The possibility of an accreditation system, which would recognise those
organisations which follow good practice with respect to confidentiality,
should be explored by the Department of Health in partnership with
interested groups.
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Recommendation 8:
The new NHS number should replace patient-identifiable data, as soon as
practically possible, in every data flow where there is a need to distinguish
between individuals but where there is no immediate corresponding need to
identify those individuals. Continued use of additional patient-identifiable data
items for other purposes must be robustly justified. The Department of
Health should urgently pilot the use of the ~HS number as the main
identifier, e.g. in contracting flows.
Recommendation 9:
The NHS Executive, in partnership with professional bodies, should develop
strict protocols to define which individuals are authorised to gain access to
patient identity, (e.g. where the new NHS number is the main identifier,
through use of the NHS Number Tracing Service or through access to
administrative or other population registers), and under what circumstances
access should be authorised
Recommendation 10:
Where particularly sensitive information is to be transferred, the use of
privacy enhancing technologies (e.g. encrypting the NHS number) must be
urgently explored.
Recommendation 11:
We recommend that the appropriate trade and professional associations are
encouraged to raise awareness amongst their members, and that institutions
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providing training in healthcare informatics are encouraged to include privacy
enhancing technologies as part of those training programmes.
Recommendation 12:
'The internal structure, and administration, of databases should reflect the
principles developed in this report, e.g. separating patient identifying details
from event, treatment, or condition information with linkage possible only
under specific and controlled circumstances. Whilst it is recognised that there
may be practical barriers to restructuring existing databases, the practicalities
of doing so should be explored.
Recommendation 13:
'The new NHS number should replace the patient's name on Items of Service
Claims made by General Practitioners as soon as is practically possible. The
software used by all General Practitioners, the Dental Practice Board and
Health Authorities should be reviewed to determine the resource
consequences of specification changes which would be required to support
changes in practice as recommended in this report.
Recommendation 14:
'The design of new systems for the electronic transfer of prescription data
should incorporate the principles developed in this report.
Recommendation 15:
Negotiations on pay and conditions for GPs should have regard to the
desirability of avoiding systems of payment which require patient identifying
details to be transmitted.
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Recommendation 16:
The practicalities of piloting new procedures for claims and payments which
do not require patient-identifiable information to be transferred should be
urgently considered, e.g. batched claims with details held in general practice
for audit purposes.
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